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COMMENTS
WHY CAN’T WE BE FRIENDS? THE
BANNING OF TEACHER-STUDENT
COMMUNICATION VIA SOCIAL MEDIA
AND THE FREEDOM OF SPEECH
GIULIA M. DI MARZO∗
Undoubtedly, the sexual abuse of children by authority figures, particularly teachers
and coaches, has been an issue of national concern for years. Recently, there have
been several high-profile child sexual abuse scandals in the news, such as the ordeal
involving Jerry Sandusky, a former Pennsylvania State University football coach, who
was convicted of forty-five child sexual abuse counts for sexually abusing ten male
children over the course of fifteen years. In an effort to prevent these tragic occurrences,
state and school district officials have targeted social media as the culprit.
As states and school districts across the nation revisit or implement social-media
policies, some take the extreme action of completely banning teachers from using social
media to communicate with students. In addition to disadvantaging students in an
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electronic era, these bans are unconstitutional, running afoul of the First Amendment,
because they are overbroad and do not pass intermediate scrutiny.
Although states and school districts have substantial leeway in disciplining their
employees for online expressions, they cannot implement laws or policies that infringe
upon employees’ expression that is constitutionally protected by the First Amendment.
States and school districts are continuously battling with the issue of how to regulate
social-media use by teachers and need guidance in crafting policies. This Comment
analyzes current laws and policies that are likely to be found unconstitutional by
courts; this Comment also provides social-media policy guidelines that, in contrast, are
likely to survive constitutional challenge.
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INTRODUCTION
When Amy Hestir was twelve years old, she was sexually abused by
1
2
one of her male teachers. This abuse lasted nearly a year. Over
thirty years later, in March of 2011, Hestir recounted her traumatic
story to the Missouri General Assembly in order to galvanize support
for legislation banning teacher-student communication via any
3
exclusive electronic media, such as social-networking websites. The
law also contained various other provisions designed to curtail child
4
sexual abuse by teachers.
In her testimony before the Missouri House Education Committee,
Hestir depicted how her abuser psychologically controlled her
through the use of threats and a pornographic novel that featured a
5
main character named “Amy.” She also described when the abuse
would occur: during her teacher’s planning hour, during the time
when her teacher would take her home after she babysat for his
daughter, and during the summer when she would meet him at
6
church. At the time, Hestir did not divulge the matter to any adults
because of the shame and fear she felt, but after nine years of silence,
she gathered the courage to report the incident and open an
7
investigation.
Unfortunately, the investigation did not produce

1. Sydney Muray, A Close Look at Missouri’s “Amy Hestir Student Protection Act,” ERIC
GOLDMAN: TECH. & MARKETING L. BLOG (Aug. 16, 2011, 4:11 PM), http://blog.eric
goldman.org/archives/2011/08/a_close_look_at.htm.
2. Id.
3. Id.; see also S.B. 54, 96th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 162.069 (Mo. 2011)
(repealed 2011). For the purpose of this Comment, exclusive electronic media
refers to the ability of teachers to directly and privately contact students via electronic
media. I refer to all forms of Internet publications, as well as text messaging and email, as electronic media. I consider social media, also known as social-networking
websites, a subset of electronic media, referring specifically to websites that enable
people to communicate via the Internet in order to share information and resources.
The term “social media” includes audio, video, images, podcasts, and other
multimedia communications.
4. Mo. S.B. 54 § 162.069; see also Allison Blood, Legislature To Take Up ‘Facebook
Bill’ in Special Session, MISSOURINET (Aug. 26, 2011), http://www.missourinet.com/
2011/08/26/legislature-to-take-up-facebook-bill-in-special-session/ (detailing the
mandates of the Amy Hestir Act, such as requiring background checks of teachers,
requiring suspension of teachers verified to have engaged in sexual misconduct, and
prohibiting registered sex offenders from participation on school boards).
5. Missouri: Amy Hestir Davis Student Protection Act—Student Abused by a Jr. High
School Teacher, SEXLAWS.ORG, http://www.sexlaws.org/amy_hestir_davis_student_
protection_act (last visited Oct. 11, 2012) [hereinafter Missouri: Amy Hestir Davis
Student Protection Act].
6. Id.
7. Id.
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results, and Hestir’s abuser continued his career in teaching by
8
transferring to a different school district.
Accounts of abuse such as this one are not anomalies; many
students around the nation share similar stories. In fact, Missouri,
the state where Hestir was abused, is ranked only eleventh in the
nation for the number of educators who have lost their licenses due
9
to sexual misconduct. States have addressed this issue in various
ways. Even though social-networking sites were not yet conceived of
when Amy Hestir was in school and sexual abuse by teachers was
10
documented as early as 430 B.C., the Missouri General Assembly
believed that banning teacher-student communication via electronic
11
media would prevent sexual abuse.
The Missouri General Assembly passed the bill, with Governor Jay
12
Nixon signing it into law on July 14, 2011. The new law, named the
“Amy Hestir Student Protection Act,” was scheduled to go into effect
13
on August 28, 2011.
The Missouri State Teachers Association,
however, opposed the law and quickly sprung into action, filing a

8. Id.; accord Muray, supra note 1 (terming the act of transferring teachers who
engage in sexual misconduct from district to district “passing the trash”); see also
Conor Friedersdorf, Let Teachers and Students Be Facebook Friends, ATLANTIC (Aug. 9,
2011, 10:40 AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2011/08/letteachers-and-students-be-facebook-friends/243324 (revealing that while Amy Hestir
reported the crime within the statute of limitations, police declined to file charges).
9. See Missouri: Amy Hestir Davis Student Protection Act, supra note 5 (citing a
congressional investigation that uncovered that approximately one in ten U.S.
students has been sexually abused during the student’s primary education by a
school employee).
10. See THORKIL VANGGAARD, PHALLOS: A SYMBOL AND ITS HISTORY IN THE MALE
WORLD 87 (1972) (“Paiderasty served the highest goal—education (paideia). Eros
was the medium of paideia, uniting tutor and pupil. The boy submitted and let
himself be taken in the possession of the man.”); see also Hein van Dolen, Greek
Homosexuality, LIVIUS, http://www.livius.org/ho-hz/homosexuality/homosexuality.
html (last visited Oct. 11, 2012) (recounting a story describing Socrates as “boy
crazy” and how Socrates would lose his senses around the beautiful boys to whom he
taught philosophy).
11. Editorial, States Miss a Social-Media Education Opportunity, WASH. POST (Aug.
19, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/states-miss-a-social-mediaeducation-opportunity/2011/08/16/gIQATbqlQJ_story.html; accord Kashmir Hill,
Why Missouri’s Ban on Teacher-Student Facebook Friendships Is Doomed, FORBES (Aug. 8,
2011, 1:56 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2011/08/08/whymissouris-ban-on-teacher-student-facebook-friendships-is-doomed/ (stating that the
purpose of the Hestir Act is to curtail improper sexual conduct between teachers and
students).
12. Michael Ruff, SB 54—Creates the Amy Hestir Student Protection Act and Establishes
the Task Force on the Prevention of Sexual Abuse of Children, MO. SENATE,
http://www.senate.mo.gov/11info/BTS_Web/Bill.aspx?SessionType=R&BillID=4066
479 (last visited Oct. 11, 2012).
13. Id.
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14

complaint against Governor Nixon for injunctive relief. A Missouri
trial court granted the injunction on August 26, 2011, finding “that
15
the statute would have a chilling effect on speech.” The court also
noted that “[e]ven if a complete ban on certain forms of
communication between certain individuals could be construed as
content neutral and only a reasonable restriction on ‘time, place and
16
manner,’ the breadth of the prohibition is staggering.” Shortly after
the court granted the injunction, the Missouri Senate repealed the
ban by passing a narrower version of the law that delegated to school
17
districts the authority to draft their own social-media policy.
Missouri is not the only state where policymakers have taken
measures to contend with concerns about the increase in socialmedia use and communication by and among teachers and students
and the potential abuse associated with such use and
18
communication. For example, in 2009, the Louisiana Legislature
passed a law categorically banning teacher-student communication
19
via social-networking sites. This law has yet to be challenged on
14. See Petition for Injunctive Relief and Declaratory Judgment, Mo. State
Teachers Ass’n v. State, No. 11AC-CC00553, 2011 WL 4425537, at *1 (Mo. Cir. Ct.
Sept. 23, 2011), available at http://www.msta.org/news/Petition_final.pdf (outlining
the Missouri State Teachers Association’s First Amendment free speech challenge to
the ban).
15. Mo. State Teachers Ass’n, 2011 WL 4425537.
16. Id.
17. S.B. 1, 96th Gen. Assemb., 1st Extra. Sess. § 162.069 (Mo. 2011).
18. See, e.g., Frank LoMonte, Louisiana Joins “Technophobia” Craze with Restraints on
Teacher-Student Communications, STUDENT PRESS L. CTR. (Nov. 16, 2009),
http://www.splc.org/wordpress/?p=308 (describing Louisiana’s social-media
regulation that attempts to prevent inappropriate relationships between teachers and
students); Ohio District Limits Teachers’ Use of Social Media, FIRST AMENDMENT CTR.
(Sept. 1, 2011), http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/ohio-district-limits-teachers’use-of-social-media (discussing the policy of Dayton Public Schools, one of Ohio’s
largest school districts, that prohibits teachers from being friends with students on
Facebook and other social-networking sites as well as “responding to students’
attempts at communicating through any personal or professional accounts not
approved by the district”); Should Teachers ‘Friend’ Students on Facebook?, ALTA. SCH.
BDS. ASS’N: VIS-À-VIS LEGAL COMMENT. (Sept. 2010), https://www.asba.ab.ca/
natlegalnews/sept10/files/hr_corner.html (recognizing that Lee County may be the
first school district in Florida to implement regulations banning all teacher-student
communication via social-networking sites); Audrey Watters, Virginia Poised To Ban
Teacher-Student
Texting,
Facebooking,
READWRITEWEB
(Jan.
9,
2011),
http://www.readwriteweb.com/archives/virginia_poised_to_ban_teacher-student_
texting_fac.php (outlining the Virginia Public Schools’ “model policy” that prohibits
teachers from using any electronic communications to contact students outside those
provided by the schools).
19. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:81(Q)(2)(b) (2009). The legislation passed in
Louisiana mirrors the social-media policies of other school districts and states. See,
e.g., DAYTON BD. OF EDUC., DAYTON PUBLIC SCHOOLS POLICY MANUAL: ACCEPTABLE USE
AND INTERNET SAFETY FOR INFORMATIONAL AND EDUCATIONAL TECHNOLOGY (2012),
available at http://www.nctq.org/docs/Dayton_Policy_Manual-Aug_2012.pdf.
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constitutional grounds. Nevertheless, the question of whether
schools can discipline public school teachers for their use of social
media has not been free from judicial scrutiny, as lower courts in
other states have adjudicated cases concerning the termination of
public school teachers for inappropriately communicating with
20
students via social-networking sites. The analysis concerning state or
school district categorical bans, however, does not center solely on a
case-by-case determination of whether a particular teacher’s speech is
inappropriate and consequently unprotected by the First
Amendment.
Rather, the analysis focuses on whether such
categorical bans, taken as a whole, are facially permissible under First
21
Amendment doctrines.
This Comment argues that state and school district regulations
banning all teacher-student communication via social-networking
websites, such as Missouri’s and Louisiana’s laws, are unconstitutional
because they are overbroad and do not survive intermediate scrutiny.
The bans are also impractical; they only target communication via
electronic media, while ignoring all other modes of communication
that can also lead to inappropriate conduct, like hand-written notes
and in-person communication. In the process, the bans also restrict
beneficial uses of electronic media that enhance education in our
modern world. This Comment continues by highlighting guidelines
that do not run afoul of the Constitution, but achieve the same goal
desired by state and school district administrators, that of curtailing
inappropriate teacher-student communication.
Part I of this Comment provides an overview of current state
legislation and school district policies banning teacher-student
communication via social media and sets forth the two available First
Amendment challenges and the applicable standards courts should
use to determine the constitutionality of such bans. Part I also
discusses the Supreme Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence
regarding teacher speech and how lower courts have applied the
Court’s framework specifically to analyze out-of-school teacher20. See, e.g., Snyder v. Millersville Univ., No. 07-1660, 2008 WL 5093140, at *1
(E.D. Pa. Dec. 3, 2008) (finding that a drunken-pirate photo and comments made by
a public school teacher about other faculty were not a matter of public concern and
therefore were not protected speech); Spanierman v. Hughes, 576 F. Supp. 2d 292
(D. Conn. 2008) (upholding the school board’s decision not to renew a teacher’s
employment contract following the discovery of inappropriate communication with
students through his MySpace page).
21. See Snyder, 2008 WL 5093140, at *16 (holding that the First Amendment did
not protect a teacher’s online postings not because they were inappropriate, but
because they did not touch on a matter of public concern).
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student communication via social-networking sites. Part II argues
that laws banning all teacher-student communication via electronic
media are facially unconstitutional because they are overbroad and
not sufficiently precise. Part II further argues that even if such bans
survive an overbreadth challenge, they would not pass constitutional
muster under the applicable standard of intermediate scrutiny.
Finally, Part III proposes alternative guidelines that would regulate
teacher-student communication via social-networking sites without
violating the First Amendment.
I.

BACKGROUND

A. Current Regulations Banning Teacher-Student Communication via
Electronic Media
22

In an era of highly-publicized child sex abuse scandals, state and
school administrations are frantically grappling for solutions to
23
protect students from inappropriate interactions with teachers. In
their attempt to eliminate such interactions, lawmakers and
policymakers across the country are focusing their attention on the
role that social media plays in facilitating communications between
teachers and students due to the potential for abuse inherent in these
24
communication media.
Several states and public school districts
22. See, e.g., Mo. State Teachers Ass’n v. State, No. 11AC-CC00553, 2011 WL
4425537 (Mo. Cir. Ct. Sept. 23, 2011) (discussing a ban on student-teacher
communication via social-media sites that resulted from what became a highly
publicized sexual abuse case, Amy Hestir’s case); Inside the Penn State Scandal, WASH.
POST, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/sports/case-against-sandusky
/?hpid=z3 (last visited Oct. 11, 2012) (summarizing the incidents of sexual abuse
that Jerry Sandusky, former Pennsylvania State University football coach, committed
against male children spanning from 1994 to 2009); Sheriff: Shop Teacher Paid Teen
Girl for Explicit Cell Pics of Herself, KATU.COM (Aug. 17, 2012, 5:38 PM),
http://www.katu.com/news/local/166580236.html (discussing the allegations
against a shop teacher for paying a young girl money to send explicit picture and
video texts via cell phone); Texas Teacher of the Year Accused of ‘Sexting’ with Teenage
Student, FOXNEWS.COM (June 1, 2012), http://www.foxnews.com/us/2012/06/01/
texas-teacher-year-accused-exting-with-teenage-student/ (explaining that John
McDaniel used text messages and the Internet to solicit and receive inappropriate
photographs of one of his fifteen-year-old students).
23. Sara Pauff & Sonya Sorich, Muscogee County Schools New Social Media Policy
Discourages ‘Friending,’ Texting Between Teachers, Students, TELEGRAPH (Jan. 14, 2012),
http://www.macon.com/2012/01/14/1862833/muscogee-county-schools-newsocial.html; Schools Tackle Rules for Social Media, WANE.COM (Jan. 15, 2012, 11:54 AM),
http://www.wane.com/dpp/news/education/schools-tackle-rules-for-social-media.
24. See Mikel J. Sporer, Social Media Laws Aim To Curb Bullying and Abuse of
Children Online, SILHA BULL., Fall 2011, 27, at 27, available at
http://www.silha.umn.edu/assets/doc/FallB2011printing.pdf (commenting that
states responded to teachers’ potential abuse of social-media sites by passing
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have recently revamped or implemented regulations and policies
restricting or banning teacher-student communication via electronic
25
means, including social-networking sites. Other states plan to revisit
their current social-media regulations to prohibit the abuse of social26
media sites. Surprisingly, the Missouri ban has been the only socialmedia ban to date that teachers have challenged on constitutional
27
grounds.
Prior to being repealed, Missouri’s law banning teacher-student
exclusive electronic communication stated that “[n]o teachers shall
establish, maintain, or use a work-related [I]nternet site unless such
site is available to school administrators and the child’s legal
28
custodian, physical custodian, or legal guardian.” Under the law,
teachers also could not have a non-work-related website that allows
29
exclusive communication with a student or a former student. The
language of the Missouri law could have been interpreted as
extending the ban to all teacher-student communication via
electronic media, including educational websites and services like
30
Blackboard and Edmodo. Additionally, the law treated exclusive
legislation aimed at limiting student-teacher communication via social media); Rules
To Limit How Teachers and Students Interact Online, TCHR. WORLD (Dec. 20, 2011),
http://www.teacher-world.com/teacher-blog/?tag=social-media-policies (reacting to
policies implemented after a minority of teachers misused social-media sites in
communicating with their students).
25. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:81(Q)(2)(b) (2009) (proscribing the use of
electronic modes of communication that are not specifically made available by the
school); DAYTON BD. OF EDUC., supra note 19 (prohibiting teachers from friending,
messaging, or texting students, or from responding to students’ messages on socialmedia sites); see also Rules to Limit How Teachers and Students Interact Online, supra note
24 (detailing the Statesboro, Georgia Public School policy that prohibits text
messages and all other private electronic communications between teachers and
students).
26. See Jennifer Preston, Rules To Stop Pupil and Teacher from Getting Too Social
Online, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2011, at A1 (stating that the school boards in California,
Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Maryland, Michigan, Missouri, New Jersey, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, Texas, and Virginia plan to revise their social-media policies in the fall
of 2012).
27. See LoMonte, supra note 18 (noting that Louisiana’s law has yet to be
challenged and asserting that if it were, it would not survive).
28. S.B. 54, 96th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 162.069 (Mo. 2011) (repealed 2011).
29. Id.
30. See Muray, supra note 1 (observing that the way the bill defines “exclusive
access” —mutual consent by both teacher and student to have access to
information — makes the scope of the bill extremely broad). Blackboard is an
educational interactive platform that allows teachers to communicate with students
and employs different technological tools to reach out to and engage students. About
Bb, BLACKBOARD, http://www.blackboard.com/About-Bb/Overview.aspx (last visited
Oct. 11, 2012). Edmodo is a social-networking website specifically designed for
teachers and their students that allows teachers to create an online community for
their classrooms. EDMODO, http://about.edmodo.com (last visited Oct. 11, 2012).
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teacher-student communication in drastically different ways
depending on the medium; the law categorically prohibited private
communication through the Internet, but only mandated that
districts create a policy to address all other avenues of
31
communication.
After the Missouri court temporarily enjoined the law, the Missouri
32
Senate repealed the law by passing a new bill. The new law requires
that school districts formulate their own social-media policy “to
prevent improper communications between staff members and
33
students.” Certain Missouri Representatives questioned the new bill
because it does not detail what a policy should contain and does not
assist school districts in drafting a policy that will pass constitutional
34
muster.
Although Missouri repealed its original ban, Missouri’s new law
leaves the door open for Missouri school districts to pass overly
restrictive bans, just like other states and school districts have
35
passed. For example, Louisiana’s ban requires that school-related
electronic communication between teachers and students must take
place via a means “provided by or . . . made available by the school
system” for this purpose; electronic communication between teachers
and students for purposes not related to educational service is
36
prohibited.
Following suit, in Ohio, the Dayton Public School
District implemented a comparable policy stating, “[D]istrict
employees shall not ‘friend’ current students on social networking
sites such as Facebook and MySpace . . . . [D]istrict employees will
not ‘instant message’ or text message current students, and will not
respond to student-initiated attempts at conversation through nondistrict-approved media, whether personal or professional
37
accounts.”
There are several educational benefits associated with the use of these educational
websites in schools. For example, they make instructors more accessible, enable
student-centered teaching approaches, accommodate different learning styles,
provide continual access to course material, and add pedagogical benefits.
Educational Benefits of Online Learning, BLACKBOARD, http://blackboardsupport.
calpoly.edu/content/faculty/handouts/Ben_Online.pdf (last visited Oct. 11, 2012).
31. Mo. S.B. 54 § 162.069.
32. S.B. 1, 96th Gen. Assemb., 1st Extra. Sess. § 162.069 (Mo. 2011) (repealing
Mo. S.B. 54 § 162.069).
33. Mo. S.B. 1 § 162.069.
34. See Sporer, supra note 24 (providing one representative’s objection that some
of the 529 school districts will adopt unconstitutional policies).
35. See supra note 18 (listing examples of restrictive social-media regulations).
36. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:81(Q)(2)(b) (2009).
37. DAYTON BD. OF EDUC., supra note 19.
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All of these regulations prohibit teachers from communicating
with students via electronic media simply because these media allow
38
exclusive interaction. Some, if not all, of the regulations can be
interpreted as extending the ban to all electronic media, regardless
39
of its function, both inside and outside of school. By attempting to
curtail inappropriate interaction between teachers and students
through social-media bans—which discriminatorily stymie exclusive
electronic communication while ignoring other methods of exclusive
communication —volumes of appropriate and beneficial speech are
40
muffled.
B. The Supreme Court’s First Amendment Free Speech Jurisprudence
The First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution protects from
government interference the rights to freedom of speech and
41
42
freedom of expression.
Beginning with Gitlow v. New York, the
Supreme Court has interpreted the Due Process Clause of the
43
Fourteenth Amendment as applying the First Amendment to state
44
and local governments. Freedom of speech is not an absolute right,
however, and the Supreme Court deems certain categories of speech,
38. See Anita Ramasastry, Can Teachers and Their Students Be Banned from Becoming
Facebook Friends?, VERDICT (Sept. 13, 2011), http://verdict.justia.com/2011/09/13/
can-teachers-and-their-students-be-banned-from-becoming-facebook-friends
(defining exclusive interaction as “a private, one-on-one means of communication”).
Senator Cunningham, in support of the Missouri law, stated that “[e]xclusive
communication is a pathway into the sexual misconduct.” Oscar Michelen, Missouri
Ban on Student-Teacher Facebook Connection Will Not Survive First Amendment Challenge,
COURTROOM STRATEGY (Aug. 3, 2011, 11:48 PM), http://www.courtroomstrategy.com
/2011/08/missouri-ban-on-student-teacher-facebook-connection-will-not-survive-firstamendment-challenge.
39. See David A. Lieb, Mo. Repeals Teacher-Student ‘Facebook’ Ban, NBCNEWS.COM
(Oct. 21, 2011, 5:54 PM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/44994464/ns/technology
_and_science-tech_and_gadgets/t/mo-repeals-teacher-student-facebook-ban
(providing an account of one teacher’s concern for how the law could be interpreted
to ban the use of editing software for the school’s yearbooks because it has an
instant-message type feature); Muray, supra note 1 (explaining that the language in
Missouri’s Amy Hestir Student Protection Act may be so broad that it has the
“unintended consequence” of banning teachers from simply having accounts on
social-networking sites also used by students).
40. See infra notes 179–218 and accompanying text (applying the Pickering and
Connick analyses to teacher speech to demonstrate examples of speech via social
media that are protected by the First Amendment).
41. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press . . . .”).
42. 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
43. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law . . . .”).
44. Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 666.
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47

such as fighting words,
criminal speech,
and obscenity,
48
unprotected by the First Amendment.
When challenging the constitutionality of laws allegedly infringing
upon First Amendment free speech rights, two general facial
challenges are available: overbreadth and failing to satisfy the
49
applicable standard of judicial scrutiny. A challenger who employs
the overbreadth doctrine to challenge a law as facially invalid under
the First Amendment would argue that the law extends too far by
50
infringing upon constitutionally protected speech. The overbreadth
51
doctrine, however, is seldom applicable or successful. Alternatively,
a challenger who attacks a law as facially unconstitutional under the
applicable standard of judicial scrutiny would argue that the state’s
52
legitimate interest is outweighed by First Amendment values.
1.

The First Amendment overbreadth doctrine
Although a First Amendment challenge is usually raised regarding
the application of a law to a particular individual—referred to as an
as-applied challenge —a challenger can also directly challenge a law
that regulates speech, as a whole, contending that the law is facially

45. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 573 (1942) (creating the
fighting words exception to the First Amendment protections of free speech with the
test for such words being “what men of common intelligence would understand
would be words likely to cause an average addressee to fight”).
46. See Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 498 (1949) (defining
criminal speech as “speech or writing used as an integral part of conduct in violation
of a valid criminal statute”).
47. See, e.g., Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 124 (1989)
(holding “Dial-a-porn” to be obscene and not protected by the First Amendment).
48. See Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 666 (articulating that it has been long established that
the freedom of speech granted by the First Amendment does not accord an absolute
right to speak or an unrestrained authority that protects all uses of language and
prohibits the punishment of a person who abuses the freedom).
49. DANIEL A. FARBER, THE FIRST AMENDMENT 49–50 (2d ed. 2003); see Richard H.
Fallon, Jr., Fact and Fiction About Facial Challenges, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 915, 937 (2011)
(describing the possible facial challenges under the First Amendment Free Speech
Clause).
50. See, e.g., Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612 (1973) (outlining the
appellants’ argument that the law was overbroad because it prohibited allegedly
protected activities).
51. Infra Part I.B.1; see also The Supreme Court, 2007 Term—Leading Cases, 122
HARV. L. REV. 276, 385, 390–91 (2008) (reporting that an overbreadth challenge is
practically impossible to succeed on for a criminal defendant who cannot win an asapplied challenge, but that in the past thirty years civil litigants have had success
employing the overbreadth doctrine).
52. See, e.g., Police Dep’t v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972) (applying the strict
standard of judicial scrutiny to invalidate a law regulating speech, specifically the
regulation of picketing based on its subject matter, as facially unconstitutional).
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unconstitutional because it is overbroad. Overbreadth is a powerful
54
doctrine that a challenger can use to challenge any governmental
regulation restricting speech even if the regulation could
55
constitutionally apply to the specific speech of the challenger. A law
is unconstitutionally overbroad if it regulates substantially more
56
A challenger can
speech than the First Amendment allows.
demonstrate that a law is overbroad by showing a significant number
57
of situations where a law could be applied unconstitutionally. The
overbreadth doctrine uniquely permits an individual, whose speech is
unprotected by the First Amendment and who could constitutionally
be punished under a more narrow statute, to argue that the law is
unconstitutional because of how it might be applied to third parties
58
not before the court. The fundamental concern of the doctrine is
that overbroad laws will significantly chill constitutionally protected
59
speech, usually as a result of imprecise and imprudent legislative
60
drafting.

53. See Alan K. Chen, Statutory Speech Bubbles, First Amendment Overbreadth, and
Improper Legislative Purpose, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 31, 40 (2003) (“[T]he law of
overbreadth forbids legislatures to draft laws so broadly that they also prohibit, or
could prohibit, substantial amounts of constitutionally protected expression.”); see
also 16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 430 (2009) (explaining the differences
between the overbreadth doctrine and a traditional as-applied challenge).
54. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 769 (1982) (noting that although the
doctrine is to be carefully applied, its effects are wide reaching, making it a “strong
medicine”).
55. See, e.g., Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 612 (allowing appellants to challenge the law
even though the state could constitutionally regulate the particular conduct of the
appellants).
56. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 432–33 (1963) (“The objectionable
quality of . . . overbreadth does not depend upon absence of fair notice to a
criminally accused or upon unchanneled delegation of legislative powers, but upon
the danger of tolerating, in the area of First Amendment freedoms, the existence of
a penal statute susceptible of sweeping and improper application.”).
57. See United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 292 (2008) (emphasizing that
under the overbreadth doctrine, a statute is facially invalid only if it bans a substantial
amount of protected speech both in an absolute sense and relative to the speech
within the scope of the statute that is legitimately regulated).
58. See Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) (observing that the Court
has repeatedly allowed overbreadth challenges without requiring the plaintiff to
demonstrate that his conduct was constitutionally permissible under a valid statute).
59. Massachusetts v. Oakes, 491 U.S. 576, 584 (1989) (plurality opinion); Ferber,
458 U.S. at 772; JEROME A. BARRON & C. THOMAS DIENES, FIRST AMENDMENT LAW 46
(4th ed. 2008).
60. See Chen, supra note 53, at 31 (“[The doctrine] is designed to ensure that
lawmakers regulate speech-related activities with great precision . . . . [T]his
precision requirement can serve as a useful tool to test the legitimacy of lawmakers’
motives; the closer the fit between the government’s chosen means and its valid
objectives, the more likely it is that lawmakers truly sought to fulfill those
objectives.”).
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The Supreme Court formulated the current overbreadth doctrine
61
In Broadrick, the Court upheld the
in Broadrick v. Oklahoma.
constitutionality of a statute that prohibited state employees from
62
engaging in partisan political activities. The Court explained that
for an overbreadth argument to succeed in invalidating a statute
primarily regulating conduct, the overbreadth of a statue must be
real and substantial, which is judged in relation to the amount of
63
speech and conduct that the statute legitimately restricts. Although
the statute in Broadrick was theoretically capable of stifling protected
speech, such as political buttons and bumper stickers, it was not
overbroad because it did not apply with certainty to a substantial
64
amount of constitutionally protected expression. Nevertheless, the
Court emphasized the legitimacy of the First Amendment
overbreadth doctrine by recognizing that “statutes attempting to
restrict or burden the exercise of First Amendment rights must be
narrowly drawn and represent a considered legislative judgment that
a particular mode of expression has to give way to other compelling
65
needs of society.”
While the Broadrick decision was limited to regulations of expressive
66
conduct, the Court also applies the overbreadth doctrine to
67
68
regulations of pure speech. For example, in New York v. Ferber, the
Court employed the overbreadth doctrine but ultimately upheld the
statute prohibiting the intentional distribution of child
69
pornography.
The Court reasoned that the statute was not
substantially overbroad because the impermissible applications of the
statute arguably amounted only to a minute fraction of the speech

61. 413 U.S. 601 (1973).
62. Id. at 610.
63. Id. at 615.
64. See id. at 609–10, 615, 618 (upholding the constitutionality of the statute
because the appellants were unable to demonstrate that the statute prohibited
protected conduct and that the protected conduct would be chilled by the statute).
65. Id. at 611–12.
66. Expressive conduct is action by a person that also communicates, or
expresses, a point or ideology. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 420 (1989)
(holding that burning an American flag is expressive conduct).
67. See, e.g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 771–72 (1982) (examining the
constitutionality of a statute prohibiting the intentional distribution of child
pornography under the overbreadth doctrine).
“Pure speech” is verbal
communication or vocal discussion, as opposed to expressive conduct. See Broadrick,
413 U.S. at 615 (juxtaposing “pure speech” against expressive conduct).
68. 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
69. Id. at 749, 773.
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70

within its scope. Further, because such a law did not infringe upon
a substantial amount of protected speech, a court could remedy any
resulting overbreadth through a case-by-case analysis of the
71
circumstances to which the law allegedly impermissibly applied.
The degree to which the legislation targets the social problem
largely contributes to its permissibility. Again, in Members of the City
72
Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, the Court upheld an ordinance that
73
The Court
prohibited the posting of signs on public property.
found that the ordinance was not overbroad because it did not
hinder any more speech than was necessary to accomplish the state’s
74
interest in eliminating visual clutter and promoting safety. After
determining that a large percentage of the signs posted in violation
of the ordinance caused tangible safety and traffic issues, the Court
rejected the overbreadth challenge because “[b]y banning [the]
signs, the City did no more than eliminate the exact source of the evil
75
it sought to remedy.”
The Court has also invalidated laws under the overbreadth
76
doctrine. In City of Houston v. Hill, for example, the Court used the
overbreadth doctrine to invalidate a municipal ordinance that made
it unlawful to interrupt a police officer in the performance of his
77
duties.
The Court asserted that when confronted with a facial
overbreadth challenge to a regulation of speech, a court must first
determine whether a “substantial amount of constitutionally
78
protected conduct” is within the reach of the regulation.
Employing this analysis, the Court found that the ordinance
70. Id. at 773 (finding that it was unlikely that the statute reached protected
expression, such as medical textbooks, because it is not often, if ever, necessary to
utilize children to produce medical or educational material in the manner that the
statute prohibited).
71. Id. at 773–74 (quoting Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 615–16).
72. 466 U.S. 789 (1984).
73. Id. at 791, 810.
74. Id. at 810.
75. Id. at 802, 808. In contrast, an ordinance that prohibits all hand-billing on
public streets is overbroad and thus invalid because the state’s interest in curtailing
littering could be achieved without abridging protected speech simply by punishing
littering. Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 162 (1939). Compare Int’l Soc’y for
Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 685 (1992) (upholding a more
narrowly drawn regulation designed to prevent solicitation at airports against First
Amendment challenges, although restrictions on distribution of publications were
invalidated), with Bd. of Airport Comm’rs. v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569, 570–
71, 577 (1987) (invalidating a regulation prohibiting First Amendment activities
within a terminal area of Los Angeles International Airport).
76. 482 U.S. 451 (1987).
77. Id. at 453, 467.
78. Id. at 458.
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criminalized a substantial amount of protected speech because,
although the ordinance prohibited obscene language, it also
prohibited all speech that could have been construed as interrupting
79
an officer. Additionally, the ordinance had the effect of making
only speech, particularly protected speech, unlawful because the
State Penal Code already expressly prohibited the targeted conduct
80
such as assault. Thus, the ordinance was not sufficiently precise to
81
prohibit only disorderly conduct or unprotected, obscene language.
Consequently, precedent disfavors those ordinances that infringe,
even inadvertently, upon constitutionally granted rights, particularly
the freedom of speech.
The Court recently applied the overbreadth doctrine in Ashcroft v.
82
Free Speech Coalition and held that two provisions of the federal Child
Pornography Protection Act of 1996 (CPPA) were facially
83
In addition to banning the possession and
unconstitutional.
distribution of pornographic material produced using actual
children, CPPA extended the ban to material not produced using
84
actual children.
Thus, CPPA was overbroad because the childprotection rationale for the speech restriction did not apply to the
85
material produced without the use of actual children.
Further,
under CPPA, a person possessing unobjectionable material —
material produced not using actual children —that someone else had
86
procured could be prosecuted. The Court found that this provision
87
did “more than prohibit pandering.” Therefore, the provision was
overbroad because it prohibited possession of material that could not
88
otherwise be proscribed. Even though the overbreadth doctrine is
rarely employed and seldom victorious in comparison to other modes

79. Id. at 460–62.
80. Id. at 460–63.
81. Id. at 465.
82. 535 U.S. 234 (2002).
83. Id. at 258.
84. Id. at 249–51.
85. See id. at 254 (rejecting the government’s arguments that erotic images using
virtual children still promoted the trafficking of works featuring real children).
86. See id. at 257–58 (noting that under this understanding, a person could be
prosecuted for possessing a movie with a suggestive title that the person knew was
mislabeled).
87. Id. at 258.
88. Cf. United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 303–04 (2008) (distinguishing the
reach of the statute in Free Speech Coalition from a statute that banned solicitation of
child pornography and holding that the latter statute was not overbroad because it
only criminalized unprotected speech—the distribution of real child pornography
or pornography believed to contain real children).
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of analysis applied in First Amendment challenges, it is still a
89
recognized and viable doctrine.
2.

Facial challenges of content-neutral regulations under the applicable
standard of intermediate scrutiny
In addition to an overbreadth challenge, government regulations
of speech can be challenged as facially violative of the First
90
Amendment under the traditional standards of judicial scrutiny. To
determine which standard of scrutiny—strict or intermediate —
applies to a particular government regulation regarding speech, the
Supreme Court distinguishes between content-based and content91
neutral regulations.
The content distinction originated in Police
92
Department v. Mosley, where a Chicago ordinance prohibited only
certain types of picketing by specific groups of individuals while
93
exempting others. The Court set forth the broad principle that the
First Amendment prohibits the government from regulating
89. See Chen, supra note 53, at 41–43 (detailing the need for the overbreadth
doctrine and the values the Supreme Court seeks to preserve through the use of the
doctrine).
90. The Supreme Court has recognized and applied three standards of judicial
scrutiny: strict, intermediate, and rational basis. Strict scrutiny is the most
demanding of the three standards; it requires that the challenged regulation be
narrowly tailored to advance a compelling governmental interest.
ERWIN
CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 289 (3d ed. 2009). The law will only be upheld if
the government can prove that it cannot achieve its goal through any less
discriminatory alternative. Id. at 719. Strict scrutiny is generally applied to laws
challenged under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments that create
classifications based on race and national origin or that regulate fundamental rights.
Id. at 289. Intermediate scrutiny requires that the law substantially relate to an
important governmental interest. Id. The Court applies intermediate scrutiny to
laws that create classifications based on gender or discriminate against non-marital
children. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (announcing that
statutory gender classifications are to be subjected to an intermediate standard of
review). The rational basis test is the least demanding level of scrutiny—a law will be
upheld if it is rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose. CHEMERINSKY,
supra, at 723. Rational basis review is applied to all laws that are not subject to strict
or intermediate scrutiny. Id. In the case of regulations placed on First Amendment
rights, the Supreme Court has either applied strict or intermediate scrutiny because
freedom of expression is viewed as a fundamental right, but the right is not absolute.
Id. at 1212.
91. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 637 (1994) (discussing the
importance of the distinction in terms of the level of scrutiny used); see also City of
Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 59 (1994) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (clarifying that
when a regulation is challenged under the First Amendment doctrine, the court
must first determine whether the regulation is content neutral and then apply the
appropriate standard of scrutiny).
92. 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
93. See id. at 94, 100 (finding that Chicago prohibited picketing involving only
labor disputes on school property to prevent school disruption).
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expression based on the expression’s message, idea, subject matter,
94
or content. A content-based law is generally defined as a law that is
95
either a subject-matter or viewpoint restriction. The Supreme Court
has reaffirmed on several occasions that the government cannot
96
regulate speech based on its content. Appropriately, strict scrutiny,
the most demanding level of scrutiny, applies when analyzing
97
content-based regulations of speech.
In contrast, a law regulating speech that applies to all speech,
98
regardless of the message, is content neutral. When a government
regulation of speech is content neutral, an intermediate standard of
99
scrutiny applies.
The Court has applied various balancing tests
under the label intermediate scrutiny by weighing the government’s
100
interest against the speaker’s interest.
The Court also factors the
reasonableness of the time, place, and manner of content-neutral
101
Importantly, the Court has, at times, described this
restrictions.
102
standard in the context of regulations of speech in public fora.
However, the Court has also applied the standard to content-neutral

94. Id. at 95.
95. Id. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 400 n.1 (1989), for an example of an
offensive content discrimination—a statute that prohibited actions that “deface,
damage, or otherwise physically mistreat [the flag].”
96. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992) (stating that
content-based regulations of expression are presumptively violative of the First
Amendment); Mosley, 408 U.S. at 95 (same).
97. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994) (explaining that
the Court’s precedent applies the most exacting standard of scrutiny to regulations
that burden or hinder speech because of its content).
98. See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (finding that
a guideline mandating the use of city-provided sound equipment and technicians was
content neutral); Members of the City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S.
789, 817 (1984) (holding that a ban on the posting of signs on public property was
content neutral); United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 385–86 (1968) (concluding
that a ban on draft card burning was content neutral).
99. See, e.g., Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. at 791 (applying intermediate scrutiny
to analyze a content-neutral guideline).
100. See Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM .
& MARY L. REV. 189, 190 (1983) (stating that the Supreme Court applies an openended form of balancing, considering if the justification is significantly substantial
and if the infringement could be lessened, to determine the constitutionality of
content-neutral regulations of speech).
101. 16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 534 (Supp. 2009); see Rock Against Racism,
491 U.S. at 797 (assessing that precedent permits reasonable restrictions on time,
place, and manner of speech).
102. See, e.g., Thomas v. Chi. Park Dist., 534 U.S. 316, 322 (2002) (analyzing the
applicability of restrictions to a municipal park ordinance requiring individuals to
obtain a permit before holding large events); Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local
Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 46–47 (1983) (considering the permissibility of
restrictions to a collective bargaining agreement limiting union access to the
interschool mail system and teacher mailboxes).
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103

regulations of speech on private property.
Thus, intermediate
scrutiny applies to content-neutral regulations regardless of the
location involved.
104
In United States v. O’Brien, the Court announced the first version
of its intermediate scrutiny balancing test: the Court will uphold a
regulation if (1) the regulation “furthers an important or substantial
government interest,” (2) the government interest does not suppress
free expression, and (3) the regulation restricts no more speech than
105
necessary to further the government’s interest. The law at issue in
O’Brien prohibited the mutilation or destruction of draft cards and
was enacted primarily to ensure the proper functioning of the draft
106
system.
Congress, in creating the law, had no other conceivable
alternative method that would ensure the continued availability of
107
the draft cards as precisely and narrowly as the enacted ban.
The
Court concluded that the law passed intermediate scrutiny because it
furthered a valid governmental interest and was narrowly tailored
seeing as it was limited to the nonexpressive facet of O’Brien’s
conduct —the burning of his draft card in what he claimed was a
108
protest of the war—and prohibited nothing further. However, the
ban on burning draft cards, albeit a content-neutral ban, did not
109
regulate time, place, or manner of protected speech.
Twenty years later, the Court clarified its test for content-neutral,
110
time, place, and manner regulations in Ward v. Rock Against Racism.
In Rock Against Racism, the Court considered the constitutionality
under the First Amendment of a guideline that mandated the use of
city-provided sound equipment and technicians to regulate the
111
volume of performances in New York City’s Central Park. New York
City had received numerous noise complaints from park users and
112
residents living in the surrounding neighborhoods.
After
103. See, e.g., Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943) (applying
reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions to an ordinance prohibiting door-todoor hand-billing).
104. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
105. Id. at 377.
106. Id. at 378–81. The regulation was created pursuant to a substantial
governmental interest. Id.
107. Id. at 381.
108. Id. at 381–82.
109. The ban regulated only expressive conduct that, even if considered to
contain a communicative or speech element, was not constitutionally protected
activity. Id. at 376.
110. 491 U.S. 781 (1989).
111. Id. at 787, 790.
112. Id. at 785.
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considering various solutions, the city concluded the most effective
way to reduce noise without limiting performances was to provide its
own high-quality sound equipment and experienced sound
113
technician.
The Court found that the city had a legitimate,
114
substantial interest in limiting excessive and disruptive noise levels.
Additionally, the city narrowly tailored the guideline to achieve its
significant interest because the guideline did not prohibit any
expressive activity; the guideline effectively only regulated the volume
115
Finally, because the guideline did not make
of such expressions.
the forum inaccessible, there remained ample alternatives for
116
communication.
The Court articulated its current intermediate scrutiny test in
analyzing Rock Against Racism: federal and local governments may
impress “reasonable restrictions on the time, place, or manner of
protected speech, provided the restrictions ‘are justified without
reference to the content of the regulated speech, that they are
narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and
that they leave open ample alternative channels for communication
117
of the information.’”
This test modified the O’Brien version with
respect to the narrow tailoring component by no longer requiring
that a regulation be the least restrictive means of accomplishing the
118
state’s interest. However, the Court emphasized that this standard
still does not permit such regulations to infringe upon substantially
more speech than is necessary to advance the government’s justifiable
119
interests. Thus, a governmental regulation is invalid if a substantial
amount of the speech it burdens does not further the state’s
120
legitimate goals.
Unlike the guideline in Rock Against Racism, the Court has found
that bans on door-to-door solicitation are generally unconstitutional
121
because a state’s interest in maintaining the cleanliness of streets or
113. Id. at 786–87.
114. Id. at 796.
115. Id. at 802.
116. Id. But cf. City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 58–59 (1994) (overturning a
ban on lawn signs because the ban eliminated an entire form of communication).
The Supreme Court has expressed its suspicion of regulations eliminating entire
forms of communication. Id. at 55–56.
117. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. at 791 (quoting Clark v. Cmty. for Creative NonViolence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)).
118. Id. at 798.
119. See id. at 799 (asserting that the government may not implement a restriction
on expression unless the restriction substantially advances the stated goals).
120. Id.
121. See Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 162–65 (1939) (stating that the
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122

preventing fraud can be more effectively furthered by means that
intrude less on First Amendment rights than a prohibition on all
123
124
solicitation. The Court in Schneider v. New Jersey struck down a law
banning the distribution of literature in streets and other public
venues by holding that an anti-littering statute could have addressed
the substantive evil the state sought to eliminate without prohibiting
125
any expressive activity.
In sum, although intermediate scrutiny is
not a highly demanding standard, the Court has used the standard to
invalidate several laws regulating speech primarily because the laws
were not sufficiently narrowly tailored, infringing upon substantially
more speech than necessary to advance the government’s legitimate
interests.
C. A Survey of Teacher Speech Jurisprudence
1.

The Supreme Court’s teacher speech jurisprudence
In addition to applying an intermediate level of scrutiny to contentneutral speech regulations, the Supreme Court similarly employs an
intermediate level of scrutiny when analyzing whether the First
Amendment protects the speech of public employees, such as
teachers. Beginning over four decades ago with Pickering v. Board of
126
Education, the Supreme Court has decided a long line of cases that
analyze specific instances where teachers and other public employees
have been fired based on speech that is allegedly inappropriate.
Supreme Court jurisprudence regarding teacher speech rights,
however, has yet to provide a framework for analyzing out-of-school
teacher speech via social media. Generally, the Court has based its
teacher speech jurisprudence on the concept that government
employers have a dual obligation:
(1) to effectively operate
institutions providing public services and (2) to operate in a manner
127
respectful of First Amendment protections.
interest in street cleanliness is an insufficient justification to abridge the freedom of
speech in question).
122. See Vill. of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 444 U.S. 620, 638–39
(1980) (finding that the ordinance in question insufficiently related to privacy
interests by applying it to public streets).
123. See, e.g., id. at 637 (asserting that the village’s legitimate interest in preventing
fraud could have been furthered through penal laws used to punish fraud directly).
124. 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
125. Id. at 162–65.
126. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
127. See id. at 568 (observing that courts have rejected the assertion that the state’s
interest in running effective schools completely trumps the need to preserve certain
aspects of teachers’ First Amendment rights).
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In Pickering, a high school teacher wrote a letter to a local
128
There, the
newspaper criticizing his employer school board.
Supreme Court first introduced the concept of balancing a public
employee’s free speech rights against a school’s interest in
129
maintaining efficient operations. The Court considered four main
factors when balancing the free speech rights of a teacher against the
responsibility of the government to function effectively: the degree
to which the speech (1) interfered with employee performance and
operation, (2) created disharmony among co-workers, (3) undercut
an immediate supervisor’s effort to maintain discipline over an
employee, and (4) undermined the relationship of loyalty and trust
130
required of confidential employees. When the above requirements
are not met, the Court will conclude that the school’s interest in
regulating a teacher’s ability to contribute to public discourse is not
significantly greater than the school’s interest in regulating such
contributions by a member of the general public, and thus the
131
speech in question would be protected.
132
Fifteen years later, the Court in Connick v. Myers clarified what
constitutes a matter of public concern and used Pickering to create a
two-part test: whether the speech is of public concern, and if so, what
133
the effect of the speech is under the balancing factors of Pickering.
In Connick, the District Attorney of the Parish of Orleans terminated
Myers, an assistant district attorney, for insubordination after Myers
circulated a questionnaire regarding private internal matters at her
134
place of employment.
Upholding Myers’s termination, the Court
reasoned that when an employee’s speech is not related to any matter
of political, social, or societal concern, government employers should
have broad authority in managing their employees without the
128. Id. at 566.
129. See id. at 568 (explaining that “[t]he problem in any case is to arrive at a
balance between the interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon
matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting
the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees”).
130. See id. at 570–71 (finding that the teacher’s critical letter presented no
problems regarding the ability of the employer to maintain either discipline by an
immediate superior or harmony among co-workers, did not involve a relationship
requiring loyalty and confidence, and did not disrupt the operation of the schools).
131. See id. at 572–73 (declaring a teacher’s dismissal by the school district
unlawful as his “erroneous public statements,” while critical of his employer, neither
impeded his proper performance of classroom duties, nor interfered with the
regular operation of the school).
132. 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
133. See id. at 146–48 (determining that a public employee’s speech is protected
when he is speaking as a private citizen on a matter of public concern).
134. Id. at 141.
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135

intrusion of the judiciary due to First Amendment challenges.
Hence, the Court elaborated upon the rule it established in Pickering
by emphasizing that the determination of whether the First
Amendment protects teacher speech turns first on whether the
136
speech touches on a matter of public concern.
The Court noted
that the judiciary is not the appropriate venue to review the
termination or punishment of a public employee when the
termination or punishment was ordered in response to that
employee’s speech concerning matters of personal interest and not
137
those of public concern spoken as a citizen.
Under a matter of
public concern analysis, a court focuses its analysis on the content,
138
If the court finds that the
form, and context of the expression.
employee spoke on a public subject, the court then applies the
139
balancing factors from Pickering to examine the effect of the speech.
More recently, the Supreme Court applied the same line of
140
reasoning to public employee speech in Garcetti v. Ceballos.
The
Court held that the First Amendment does not protect against
employer disciplinary action statements made by public employees
when the statements were made pursuant to employees’ duties as
141
public employees and not in their role as regular citizens.
Nevertheless, statements by public employees not made pursuant to
their official duties might be protected under the First Amendment
because such statements are of the kind regularly made by citizens
142
not employed by the government. Therefore, the Garcetti holding is
arguably limited and applicable only to public employees’ speech
made pursuant to their official responsibilities and not to any speech
143
made otherwise.
Additionally, the Court explicitly declined to
decide whether the Garcetti holding extended to the teaching
144
context.
Although the Supreme Court has not been confronted

135. Id. at 147–48.
136. See id. (differentiating those matters of public concern, for which speech
should be protected, from private matters, for which the state may impose
punishment).
137. See id. (proclaiming that the responsibility of a court does not include the
handling of private work-related grievances).
138. Id.
139. Id. at 146; Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
140. 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
141. Id. at 423.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 424.
144. Id. at 425.
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with a teacher speech case specifically concerning teacher speech via
social media, lower courts have faced the issue.
2.

Lower court cases analyzing teacher speech via social media
Lower courts have taken slightly different approaches in their
analyses addressing teacher-student communication via social media
but have generally employed the Supreme Court’s matters of public
145
146
In Spanierman v. Hughes, a public school teacher
concern test.
challenged the termination of his employment that resulted from
postings on his MySpace page, a social-networking website, which
included various conversations with his students about their personal
lives, naked pictures of men, and a poem he wrote in opposition to
147
The U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut held
war.
that the comments regarding students’ romantic lives were not a
matter of public concern and thus were not protected by the First
Amendment; however, the poem the teacher wrote qualified as a
148
matter of public concern and thus was protected. The district court
applied the following framework: To succeed on a First Amendment
retaliation claim, a plaintiff must make a showing by a
preponderance of the evidence that the plaintiff’s constitutionally
protected speech was a “motivating factor” in bringing about the
149
First, the
adverse employment decision or determination at issue.
court focused on whether the teacher spoke pursuant to his official
150
responsibilities under Garcetti.
The court held that the plaintiff
teacher was not acting pursuant to his employment duties when using
his MySpace account because he was not under any employment
obligation to make statements that were not related to an educational
151
subject.
Because the Garcetti test was not applicable, the court
152
applied the Connick matter of public concern test.
The court
clarified that the First Amendment generally protects expression that
153
is related to any matter of political, social, or societal concern.

145. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 159–60 (1983) (outlining the “two classes
of speech of public concern: statements ‘of public import’ because of their content,
form and context, and statements that, by virtue of their subject matter, are
‘inherently of public concern’”).
146. 576 F. Supp. 2d 292 (D. Conn. 2008).
147. Id. at 289.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 308.
150. Id. at 309 (citing Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006)).
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. (citing Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983)).
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Thus, the court concluded that the comments on the teacher’s
MySpace page were varied as to whether they were protected under
154
the First Amendment.
155
In Snyder v. Millersville University, another district court applied
the public concern test to determine whether a teacher’s comments
156
and pictures on MySpace were protected by the First Amendment.
The teacher had invited her students to view her personal MySpace
page, which contained a photograph of herself drinking alcohol and
comments relating to difficulties that she was having with a fellow
157
teacher. The court held that since the postings raised only issues of
a personal nature, they did not relate to a matter of public concern
158
and consequently were not protected speech. Since the postings
were not protected, the teacher’s First Amendment rights were not
159
violated when she was penalized for the postings.
Although the courts in Spanierman and Snyder ultimately held that
the First Amendment did not protect the teacher speech in question,
circumstances exist under which teacher speech via social media is
160
conceivably protected.
Thus, a court confronted with a First
Amendment challenge of a regulation banning all teacher-student
communication via electronic media would first need to determine
whether the ban reaches speech that is protected by the First
161
Amendment. If all of the speech being regulated is not protected,
the government has the authority to impose any restrictions it may
desire because the speech does not come within the purview of the
162
First Amendment.
If, however, the ban is found to extend to
protected speech, then a court would analyze the ban under the
163
applicable First Amendment doctrines. If the speech is protected,
154. Id. at 310.
155. No. 07-1660, 2008 WL 5093140 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 3, 2008).
156. Id. at *14.
157. Id. at *6.
158. Id. at *16.
159. Id.
160. See infra notes 179–214 and accompanying text (discussing examples of
protected and appropriate teacher speech via social media).
161. See FARBER, supra note 49, at 13–14 (maintaining that “the first step in
analyzing any First Amendment” challenge is to determine whether the speech falls
under an unprotected category of speech).
162. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 90, at 1321, 1596 (explaining that the categories
of speech the Supreme Court has deemed unprotected, such as fighting words and
obscenity, can be prohibited and punished freely by the government and that speech
by public employees is not protected unless it regards a matter of public concern).
163. The most integrated and common First Amendment doctrine is content
distinction, which determines the level of judicial scrutiny that will be applied to
analyze a regulation. FARBER, supra note 49, at 21. There are also three doctrines
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employers cannot unduly restrict those expressions of their
employees.
II. REGULATIONS BANNING TEACHER-STUDENT COMMUNICATION VIA
ELECTRONIC MEDIA ARE FACIALLY UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE THEY
ARE OVERBROAD AND FAIL INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY
First Amendment jurisprudence dictates that the right of free
speech is not an absolute right protecting individuals from
164
governmental intrusion. Depending on the regulation’s purpose —
that is, whether it is to regulate the content of an expression or
simply the time, place, or manner of an expression irrespective of its
165
166
content —courts employ different levels of judicial scrutiny.
An
individual also can facially challenge a regulation under the First
167
Amendment employing the overbreadth doctrine.
Although the requisite showing under the overbreadth doctrine is
a heavy burden, situations exist where a regulation does more than
eliminate the exact source of evil it seeks to remedy and thus can be
168
deemed overbroad.
A regulation banning all communication
between teachers and students via electronic media reaches a
substantial amount of expression that the First Amendment protects;
the protected language that the broad ban reaches is not the evil that
169
a teacher-student communication ban is meant to eliminate.
By
seeking to curtail inappropriate interactions between teachers and
students in order to prevent incidents of child sexual abuse,
regulations on all electronic communication have the effect of
banning ample beneficial and appropriate communications, while
failing to eliminate inappropriate contact between teachers and

that a speaker can invoke without having to demonstrate that his or her particular
speech was protected: prior restraints, overbreadth, and vagueness. Id. at 45–46, 49.
164. See supra notes 45–48 and accompanying text (enumerating the categories of
speech that the Supreme Court has deemed unprotected under the First
Amendment).
165. See supra notes 91–103 and accompanying text (discussing the contentneutral and content-based distinction and the applicable standards of scrutiny).
166. See Russell W. Galloway, Basic Free Speech Analysis, 31 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 883,
886 (1991) (providing an overview of the standards of judicial scrutiny and the types
of regulations to which each usually applies).
167. E.g., Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234 (2002); City of Houston v.
Hill, 482 U.S. 451 (1987).
168. See discussion supra Part I.B.1 (detailing Supreme Court overbreadth
jurisprudence).
169. See infra notes 179–214 and accompanying text (examining examples of
teacher-student communication via social media that are protected under the
Court’s Pickering and Connick tests).
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170

students. Therefore, it is unlikely that such regulations would pass
constitutional muster under the overbreadth doctrine.
Because a reviewing court would apply an intermediate standard of
scrutiny to a content-neutral regulation of expression, such as a
regulation banning all teacher-student communication via electronic
media, most content-neutral regulations easily pass the not overly
171
demanding standard.
Nevertheless, circumstances exist in which
172
For example, a
regulations would fail intermediate scrutiny.
regulation that serves a compelling governmental interest may fail
intermediate scrutiny if the regulation does not effectively address
this interest. Protecting a child’s health and safety is a historically
recognized compelling governmental interest and therefore satisfies
173
the first prong of the intermediate scrutiny analysis.
Even though
the end— protecting children from sexual abuse —is a valid
compelling interest, a regulation that does not effectively address this
end and also prohibits a large amount of appropriate and arguably
protected speech will not survive the narrow tailoring prong of
174
intermediate scrutiny.
For a regulation on teacher-student communication to be valid, it
must not prohibit entire modes of communication, and lawmakers
must draw the regulation precisely to address the compelling
175
governmental interest.
Because regulations banning entire modes
of communication burden substantially more speech than necessary
and several less restrictive effective alternatives are available, the
teacher-student electronic communication bans would most likely not

170. See infra notes 249–51 and accompanying text (arguing that bans on teacherstudent communication via electronic media will not curtail child sex abuse by
teachers).
171. See Ashutosh Bhagwat, The Test That Ate Everything: Intermediate Scrutiny in First
Amendment Jurisprudence, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 783, 785 (demonstrating that when
applying intermediate scrutiny, courts usually favor the government and, as a
consequence, substantial amounts of valuable speech are squelched).
172. See, e.g., Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 161–62 (1939) (invalidating a
complete ban on hand-billing under intermediate scrutiny because the ban was not
narrowly tailored to achieve the government’s interests).
173. See, e.g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 757 (1982) (recognizing the
protection of children from sexual exploitation and abuse as a compelling state
interest).
174. See, e.g., Schneider, 308 U.S. at 161–62; see also infra notes 245–58 and
accompanying text (analyzing whether the bans further the state’s interest in
protecting children from sexual abuse and consequently whether they are narrowly
tailored).
175. See Galloway, supra note 166, at 933–39 (outlining the components of
intermediate scrutiny and demonstrating how a content-neutral regulation can satisfy
the standard).
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withstand a facial constitutional challenge under either the
176
overbreadth doctrine or intermediate scrutiny.
A. Bans on Teacher-Student Electronic Communication Are Facially
Unconstitutional Under the First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine
State and school district bans on teacher-student communication
via social-networking sites and other exclusive electronic methods of
communication are substantially overbroad because they prohibit a
vast body of appropriate, protected speech, while only curtailing, at
most, a limited amount of inappropriate speech.
A law is
unconstitutionally overbroad if it regulates substantially more speech
than the First Amendment allows, and a person to whom the law can
be permissibly applied can argue that it would be unconstitutional as
177
applied to others. Substantial overbreadth can be demonstrated by
a showing of a significant number of situations where a law prohibits
not just its intended target, but encompasses constitutionally
178
protected expressions as well.
There are a considerable number of situations in which bans on
teacher-student electronic communication could be applied to
prohibit constitutionally protected speech or, at the very least,
beneficial and appropriate speech. When a law is being challenged
under the overbreadth doctrine, a court will first determine whether
a substantial amount of constitutionally protected expression is
179
within the gamut of the law. A court could also find overbreadth by
determining that a regulation eliminates significantly more
expression than the speech that is “the exact source of the evil it
180
sought to remedy.”
To establish whether a law reaches protected
teacher speech, a court would initially determine whether any of the

176. See discussion infra Part II.A–B (applying the overbreadth doctrine and
intermediate scrutiny to determine the constitutionality of the bans).
177. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 432–33 (1963); supra Part I.B.1 (detailing
the Supreme Court’s overbreadth jurisprudence).
178. See United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 293–94 (2008) (beginning the
overbreadth analysis by construing the statute to determine what the statute covered
and how far it reached).
179. See City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 458 (1987) (quoting Vill. of
Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 494 (1982))
(acknowledging that a court’s initial task is to determine the effects of enactment on
constitutionally protected behaviors).
180. See Members of the City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 808
(1984) (noting that because the ordinance banned signs that constituted visual
clutter and blight, the ordinance did no more than eliminate the exact source of evil
sought to be remedied).
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181

speech that is prohibited relates to a matter of public concern.
182
Then, the court would apply the Pickering analysis.
There are a variety of purposes for which social media can
generally be used, such as staying connected with friends and family,
sharing pictures and information, marketing, and meeting new
183
Additionally, social media can be used to share art and
people.
news stories and to comment upon other matters of public concern
184
contemplated in Connick. There are certainly ample circumstances
in which teacher speech via social media could be related to matters
of political, social, or societal concern and consequently would satisfy
185
the Connick analysis.
A teacher commenting on public issues such
as war, politics, topics regarding the school district, and day-to-day
problems teenagers face presumably would be speaking on matters of
public concern under Connick, and therefore the speech would be
186
protected by the First Amendment.
After determining that the speech being banned relates to a matter
of public concern, a court would next employ a Pickering analysis,
balancing the speech rights of the individual against the
187
responsibility of the government to function effectively. Under the
Pickering analysis, the four main factors courts consider are whether
the speech (1) interfered with employee performance and operation,
(2) created disharmony among co-workers, (3) undercut an
immediate supervisor’s discipline over an employee, and (4)
destroyed the relationship of loyalty and trust required of

181. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147–48 (1983) (acknowledging that it is
inappropriate for a federal court to review the personnel decisions taken by an
employer of a public employee who speaks as an employee on matters of personal
interest).
182. See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) (describing the need
to balance the competing interests of the public employee’s free speech rights with
those of the public employer striving to promote efficient public services).
183. What Is Social Networking?, SOCIAL NETWORKING, http://www.whatissocial
networking.com (last updated July 18, 2012).
184. See, e.g., Spanierman v. Hughes, 576 F. Supp. 2d 292, 309–10 (D. Conn. 2008)
(determining that under Connick, a poem posted on MySpace by a teacher was a
matter of public concern because it constituted a political statement).
185. See Connick, 461 U.S. at 152 (cautioning that a stronger showing of
“disruption of the office and the destruction of working relationships” is necessary
for an employer to take action if the employee’s speech involves “matters of public
concern”). But see Rachel A. Miller, Comment, Teacher Facebook Speech: Protected or
Not?, 2011 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 637, 637 (describing the accounts of a teacher who
resigned after posting that her students were “germbags” on Facebook and another
teacher who was suspended after being tagged in a photo posted by another user that
showed the teacher with a stripper at a bachelorette party).
186. Connick, 461 U.S. at 144–45.
187. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568.
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188

confidential employees.
Further, speech determined to be on a
matter of public concern may only lose its protected status under the
First Amendment when actual disruption to the government’s
189
function is demonstrated.
A large portion of teacher-student speech via social media, when
balanced under Pickering, does not implicate any of the four factors
and does not compromise the responsibility of the government to
function effectively. Teacher-student communication via electronic
media can either be related to education or can regard matters
190
completely unrelated to education.
Teacher speech via social
191
media does not generally implicate the Pickering factors;
additionally, inappropriate teacher speech via electronic media has
seldom been found and can be remedied through employment
192
termination on a case-by-case basis.
Teacher speech via social
193
But
media can occur both inside and outside the school context.
the bans seem to be concerned primarily with the use of electronic
media outside the school context for purposes not pursuant to a
194
teacher’s official duties. In such a context, the majority of teacherstudent communication via electronic media would not interfere with

188. Id. at 570–71 & n.3.
189. See Connick, 461 U.S. at 152 (cautioning that a substantial showing that the
disruption and destruction of a workplace relationship will take place is necessary).
190. See Paul Forster, Teaching in a Democracy: Why the Garcetti Rule Should Apply to
Teaching in Public Schools, 46 GONZ. L. REV. 687, 711 (2010) (advancing examples of
electronic teacher speech ranging from speech for instructional purposes to speech
on a social-media site expressed “for purely personal purposes”).
191. See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 570–71 & n.3 (noting that teachers who voice their
differing opinions of school operations are not per se detrimental to the interests of
the school).
192. See Social Networking in Schools: Educators Debate the Merits of Technology in
Classrooms, HUFFINGTON POST (May 27, 2011, 6:12 AM), http://www.huffington
post.com/2011/03/27/social-networking-schools_n_840911.html (asserting that
despite the fear created by sexual predators operating through social media, the risk
is less than commonly believed).
193. See Tod Robberson, Even Teachers Have Free-Speech Rights, DALLASNEWS.COM
(Aug. 29, 2011, 2:17 PM), http://dallasmorningviewsblog.dallasnews.com/archives/
2011/08/even-teachers-h.html (discussing a teacher’s suspension for posting a
comment about same-sex marriage and explaining that if the teacher had posted the
comment off the clock it would have had different legal implications than if the
teacher had posted the comment during school).
194. This is clear from the stated purpose of these regulations and the statements
made by advocates of the regulations, particularly Senator Cunningham’s comments
explaining that the focus of the Missouri law was only on teacher speech outside the
school context. Joshua Rhett Miller, New Missouri Law Bans ‘Exclusive’ Online Contact
Between Teachers, Students, FOXNEWS.COM (Aug. 2, 2011), http://www.foxnews.com/
us/2011/08/02/new-missouri-law-bans-exclusive-online-contact-between-teachersstudents. Yet the bans do not specifically distinguish social media used inside or
outside of school or for what particular purpose it is being employed. Id.
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employee performance and operation, would not create disharmony
among co-workers, would not undercut an immediate supervisor’s
discipline over an employee, and would not affect the relationship of
195
loyalty and trust required of teachers.
Unlike the speech addressed in Connick, which was found to have
created disharmony among co-workers and undermined the
196
employer’s authority, teacher-student speech via social media would
rarely, if ever, be related to the quality of the teacher’s work
197
environment or issues with the management or employer; thus, it
198
would not implicate the second and third Pickering factors.
Also,
the speech that is being banned — speech that is between teachers
199
and students—is not directed at employers or co-workers. Further,
the speech prohibited by these bans would not infringe on the
relationship of loyalty and trust required of teachers because, as
explained in Pickering, teachers are not in a position of public
employment in which the need for confidentiality is notable due to
the nature of the information accessible to them through their
200
employment.
Even so, the banned speech is typically on
educational topics and not about confidential employment
201
information.
Teachers play a critical role in the development of
their students; this role comes with certain obligations, such as setting
positive examples, ensuring students receive the life skills they need
195. See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 570–71 & n.3 (extrapolating the factors the Court
uses to balance the free speech rights of a teacher with the state’s interest in
maintaining efficient functioning).
196. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 151–52 (1983).
197. See Emily H. Fulmer, iBrief, Privacy Expectations and Protections for Teachers in
the Internet Age, 2010 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 14, ¶ 64 (asserting that teachers who
communicate with their students via social media do not inherently harm those
students). But see id. (advancing that many teachers comment on their social-media
profiles about their students and workplaces).
198. See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 570 (describing the second and third relevant factors
in balancing the free speech rights of a teacher with the responsibility of the
government to function effectively).
199. Cf. id. at 569–70 (holding that there was no question of maintaining either
discipline by immediate superiors or harmony among co-workers under the
circumstances because the statements that the teacher made were in no way directed
toward any supervisor or co-worker that the teacher came in contact with in the
course of his daily work).
200. Cf. id. at 570 n.3 (finding that the teacher who wrote the letter criticizing his
employer did not have the kind of relationship with his employer for which personal
loyalty and confidence are necessary to their effective functioning and that his
position as a teacher was not a position in public employment for which the need for
confidentiality is significant).
201. See Social Networking in Schools, supra note 192 (addressing a study in which a
teacher initiated a social-media pilot program in her school that positively affected
students’ grades and improved rates of absenteeism).
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for the future, and being accessible to students in order to assist them
202
Bans on teacherthrough any struggles that they may encounter.
student communication via social media significantly hinder teachers
in their ability to cultivate a trusting environment because students
and teachers heavily rely on such media to communicate about issues
203
that students only feel comfortable confiding to their instructors.
Therefore, in the context of teacher-student communication via
social media, the first Pickering factor—interference with employee
performance and operation —is the most viable argument for
204
banning such communications.
There are several contexts, however, in which teacher speech via
social media would enhance, rather than interfere with, employee
performance and operation and thus would not fail under the
205
Pickering analysis. For example, teachers can utilize social media “to
get to know their students better [and] to let students submit
206
homework, share projects, and access calendars or a syllabus.”
Use
of social media can serve as an “exoskeleton”—that is, educational
207
Social media can also be
support outside of the school context.
202. See Michelle Blessing, Teachers’ Responsibilities to Students in the Classroom,
http://www.ehow.com/list_7623924_teachers-responsibilities-studentsclassroom.html (last visited Oct. 11, 2012) (noting some roles for teachers in
addition to the baseline responsibility to educate students); What Makes a Great
Teacher?, GREAT SCHS., http://www.greatschools.org/improvement/quality-teaching/79-whatmakes-a-great-teacher.gs (last visited Oct. 1, 2012) (explaining that great teachers are
accessible to students and are available when students need them).
203. Jacqueline Vickery, Missouri’s New “Facebook Law”—Protecting Kids By Policing
Teachers?, (Aug. 10, 2011, 3:30 PM), http://www.jvickery.com/2011/08/missourisnew-facebook-law-protecting.html; see Allison Blood, Interpretations Vary on New Online
Communication Law, MISSOURINET (Aug. 4, 2011), http://www.missourinet.com/
2011/08/04/interpretations-vary-on-new-online-communication-law-audio/
(asserting that social-media bans remove a valuable resource that permits teachers to
connect with students through a means in which students feel comfortable); Josie
Fraser, Teachers Must Engage with Social Media, OLIVER QUINLAN: LIVE BLOGS (Apr. 16,
2012), http://www.oliverquinlan.com/liveblogs/?p=576 (arguing that teachers need
to understand where students are coming from to effectively help them).
204. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 570. Skeptics of social-media use by teachers fear that
social media will distract teachers and students in the classroom; lead to noneducational, inappropriate remarks; and negatively affect learning. Trip Gabriel,
Speaking Up In Class, Silently, Using Social Media, N.Y. TIMES (May 12, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/13/education/13social.html?pagewanted=all.
However, high school and elementary school teachers actually employing such
technology with their students have found the opposite results. Id.
205. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 571.
206. See Laila Weir, Kids Create—and Critique on—Social Networks, EDUTOPIA (May
27, 2009), h t t p : / / w w w . e d u t o p i a . o r g / d i g i t a l - g e n e r a t i o n - y o u t h - n e t w o r k l i t e r a c y (asserting that social media also assists students with interacting with their
parents on an educational level).
207. See id. (equating social media to an “exoskeleton” in that it “exists on the
outside but supports the inside”).
EHOW,
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used to create a classroom community and nurture a sense of
208
belonging among students. Furthermore, teachers are mentors for
many students and, at times, students will have issues that they only
feel comfortable discussing with a teacher, such as parental abuse,
209
bullying, or possibly thoughts of suicide.
Often, children may be
embarrassed or scared when approaching an adult with these issues;
consequently, communicating via social media is the only mode of
communication children might feel comfortable using because they
210
can avoid a face-to-face conversation.
In contrast to the Missouri General Assembly, organizations, such
as the National School Boards Association, and individuals in
academia are advocating for greater use of social-networking media
by teachers as an educational tool and a way to effectively
211
communicate with students.
These advocates recognize that
technology is variable and constantly advancing and, as a result,
students should be exposed to this technology in order to be
212
adequately prepared for the future.
Social media provides an
208. Connecting Your Classroom with Facebook, NE. UNIV. EDTECH (Nov. 14, 2006),
http://www.northeastern.edu/edtech/demonstrations_events/connecting_your_clas
sroom_facebook.
209. See Ramasastry, supra note 38 (addressing the policy and issues behind the
Missouri law regarding teacher-student speech via social media); Vickery, supra note
203 (acknowledging the social-media interaction between student and teacher as
another outlet available to students in need of personal guidance).
210. See Vickery, supra note 203 (arguing that beneficial conversations should not
be prohibited just because students may not feel comfortable having them in person
with the teacher).
211. See NAT’L SCH. BDS. ASS’N, CREATING & CONNECTING: RESEARCH AND
GUIDELINES ON ONLINE SOCIAL— AND EDUCATIONAL —NETWORKING 7 (2007), available
at http://socialnetworking.procon.org/sourcefiles/CreateandConnect.pdf (asserting
that it is in a school district’s best interest to reexamine their social-media policy to
allow the use of these media because study findings indicate both school district
officials and parents believe that social media provides positive opportunities in
education and plays a beneficial role in students’ lives); Rich L. Kaye, Social Network
Technology in the Classroom, EZINE ARTICLES, http://ezinearticles.com/?Social-NetworkTechnology-in-the-Classroom&id=1087558 (last visited Oct. 11, 2012) (suggesting
that teachers should be encouraged to utilize social media because of the speed at
which technology is evolving); Social Networking in the Classroom: Ideas for Social
Networking with Students, EDUC. TECH. NETWORK, http://www.edtechnetwork.com/
social_networking.html (last visited Oct. 11, 2012) (finding that because social
media is used daily by students, teachers should take advantage of the opportunity by
using these resources as part of their curriculum and using social media to enhance
student-teacher communication).
212. See Steve Olenski, Should Teachers and Students Be Allowed To Communicate via
Social Media?
Follow Up, SOC. MEDIA TODAY (Nov. 9, 2011),
http://socialmediatoday.com/steve-olenski/385170/should-teachers-and-studentsbe-allowed-communicate-social-media-follow (asserting that students who interact
using social media and technology are prepared for the future as well as for career
paths that have yet to be identified); Fran Smith, How To Use Social-Networking
Technology for Learning, Edutopia (Apr. 20, 2007), http://www.edutopia.org/social-
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excellent educational tool for teachers and a method to reach out to
less sociable students to get them involved and excited about
213
learning. Moreover, teachers can use these sites to provide critical
214
support to students who are at-risk.
Because a substantial amount of teacher speech in the context of
teacher-student electronic communication can be classified as
protected under a Pickering analysis, it is apparent that regulations
banning teacher-student communications via electronic media are
215
The
not narrowly tailored and thus are significantly overbroad.
laws plainly prohibit teachers from using any electronic media, such
as Blackboard, Facebook, and Gmail, because these media have
functions that allow teachers to communicate with a student
216
exclusively.
These regulations completely ban a form of
communication between educators and students—a form of
communication that encompasses several different media platforms

networking-how-to (reporting the views of Chris Lehmann, principal of a
Philadelphia school, regarding the beneficial uses of social media by educators, such
as a method of teaching students how to effectively interact and collaborate with
others and how to become informed and cultured citizens).
213. See NAT’L SCH. BDS. ASS’N, supra note 211, at 9 (“Some schools and educators
are experimenting successfully with chat rooms, instant messaging, blogs, wikis and
more for after-school homework help, review sessions and collaborative projects, for
example. These activities appeal to students—even students who are reluctant to
participate in the classroom.”); Preston, supra note 26 (intimating that educators are
concerned that restrictive social-media policies will eliminate an effective tool for
engaging students because students are regularly using social media to
communicate); Curtis Clifford Cain, Social Networking Teaching Tools: A Computer
Supported Collaborative Interactive Learning Environment for K–12 (Aug. 9, 2010)
(unpublished M.S. thesis, Auburn University), available at http://etd.auburn.edu/
etd/bitstream/handle/10415/2190/Cain.Thesis.Final.pdf?sequence=2 (concluding
that using social media in school lectures facilitates collaboration between students
in K–12 and creates a more engaging and thought-provoking learning experience);
Alicia Russell, Social Networking Tools Highlighted at Teaching with Technology Day:
Knowledge Sharing and Creation, NE. UNIV. EDTECH (Mar. 2007), http://www.north
eastern.edu/edtech/about/columns/social_networking_tools_highli (highlighting
various examples of social media that teachers effectively employ to engage their
students in the classroom and promote collaboration).
214. See Ramasastry, supra note 38 (arguing that social-networking bans can
possibly harm “students who face a crisis, need a role model, or simply want to talk to
a teacher”).
215. But see Forster, supra note 190, at 711–13 (contending that Pickering provides
limited protection to teacher speech via social media because even though the
speech in question may involve nonschool matters, Pickering only protects speech
involving a matter of public concern—a requirement that most teacher speech does
not meet).
216. Rob Arcamona, Facebook, Students and Teachers: A Question of Free Speech,
KQED, http://mindshift.kqed.org/2011/09/facebook-students-and-teachers-aquestion-of-free-speech (last visited Oct. 11, 2012); see supra Part I.A (discussing
current state legislation and school district policies banning teacher-student
communication via social media).
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and stifles an ample amount of protected speech. As the Missouri
court found, social media is generally the principal means of
218
By banning this
communication between teachers and students.
entire mode of communication, the laws are stifling the potential
benefits of technology to students.
While in Ferber, the statute prohibiting child pornography could
have only potentially overreached to appropriate speech in an
insignificant number of instances, teacher-student communication
219
bans regulate speech that is primarily appropriate. In Taxpayers for
Vincent, the appellees did not demonstrate a realistic danger that the
ordinance compromised individuals’ First Amendment protections or
that a majority of the prohibited signs did not create safety or traffic
220
problems that the ordinance sought to eliminate.
Unlike the
circumstances in Taxpayers for Vincent, regulations like the Missouri
ban present a verifiable danger to individuals’ free speech rights and
apply to many communications that do not relate to the evil the state
221
is attempting to eliminate. Here, the substantive evil—child sexual
abuse —is not created by the medium of expression itself, but is
222
merely a possible by-product of the activity.
Further, because the
vast majority of the speech that the regulations ban does not trigger
the state’s interest in protecting students from sexual abuse, the

217. Mo. State Teachers Ass’n v. State, No. 11AC-CC00553, 2011 WL 4425537
(Mo. Cir. Ct. Sept. 23, 2011); see Chad Garrison, Missouri Teachers Sue State over
Facebook Ban, RIVERFRONT TIMES (Aug. 19, 2011, 4:13 PM), http://blogs.riverfront
times.com/dailyrft/2011/08/missouri_teachers_sue_state_over_social_med
ia_law.php (quoting Todd Fuller, a spokesman for the Missouri State Teachers
Association, who stated that the Missouri ban completely inhibits a teacher’s ability to
communicate with students and parents); Ramasastry, supra note 38 (summarizing
the Missouri court’s ruling that found the social-media ban implicated teachers’ free
speech rights because it completely banned a form of communication).
218. Mo. State Teachers Ass’n, 2011 WL 4425537; Ramasastry, supra note 38.
219. Compare New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 773 (1982) (giving examples of the
protected forms of expression that could fall within the purview of the statute, such
as medical textbooks and pictorials in National Geographic), with Social Networking in
Schools, supra note 192 (reporting that the benefits of teachers using social media far
outweigh the costs and quoting Amanda Lenhart with the Pew Research Center’s
Internet and American Life Project who explained that, generally, online child
sexual predation is less of a risk than it is made out to be).
220. Members of the City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 802
(1984).
221. See supra notes 179–214 and accompanying text (providing examples of
social-media use by teachers that do not contribute to the threat of child sexual
abuse).
222. Cf. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. at 808–10 (distinguishing Schneider’s
overbroad ban on all hand-billing that attempted to curtail littering, a by-product of
the expression, from the ordinance in this case that banned postings on public
property to eliminate visual blight, which was itself created directly by the postings).
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resulting overbreadth is so significant that it would not be curable
through a case-by-case analysis of the fact situations in which the
223
In essence, because the
regulations arguably may not be applied.
inverse of the reasoning in Broadrick is logical in this context, the rare
instances where teacher speech via social media is inappropriate
224
should be remedied through a case-by-case approach.
A law banning teacher-student communication via electronic
media is analogous to the ordinance in Hill, which made it unlawful
225
to interrupt police officers in the performance of their duties. The
Hill ordinance had the effect of making only speech, particularly
protected speech, unlawful because the State Penal Code already
expressly prohibited the targeted conduct, such as assaulting police
226
officers.
A law banning student-teacher communication via
electronic media, like the Hill ordinance, is an effort to eliminate
inappropriate conduct, such as the abuse suffered by Amy Hestir, that
227
is also already illegal.
Sexual harassment of students by their
teachers, to which the Office of Civil Rights has given an expansive
definition, is prohibited by Title IX of the Education Amendments of
228
1972, just as assault was criminally prohibited by the State Penal

223. See Ferber, 458 U.S. at 773–74 (determining that because the statute only
theoretically could overreach to protected material, any overbreadth that could have
existed should have been “cured through [a] case-by-case analysis” of the
circumstances (quoting Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615–16 (1973))).
224. Cf. Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 615–16 (directing that because the statute did not
infringe upon a substantial amount of protected expressive conduct, any overbreadth
that resulted should have been remedied through a case-by-case analysis of the
circumstances in which the statute allegedly was unconstitutionally being applied).
225. City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 451 (1987); supra notes 76–81 and
accompanying text.
226. Hill, 482 U.S. at 460.
227. See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 566.095 (2011) (“A person commits the crime of
sexual misconduct in the third degree if he solicits or requests another person to
engage in sexual conduct under circumstances in which he knows that his requests
or solicitation is likely to cause affront or alarm.”).
228. See 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2006) (prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sex,
including sexual harassment, in private and public education programs and activities
receiving federal financial assistance). Sexual harassment of students is a form of
discrimination prohibited by Title IX. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC.,
SEXUAL HARASSMENT: IT’S NOT ACADEMIC 1 (2008), available at http://www.ed.gov/
about/offices/list/ocr/docs/ocrshpam.pdf.
The U.S. Department of Education’s Office for Civil Rights (OCR), the federal
agency responsible for enforcing Title IX, has interpreted Title IX as a protection of
students from sexual harassment by school employees, other students, or third
parties. Id. OCR has delineated examples of conduct that constitute sexual
harassment such as “making sexual propositions or pressuring students for sexual
favors; . . . displaying or distributing sexually explicit drawings, pictures, or written
materials; . . . [and] circulating or showing e-mails or Web sites of a sexual nature.”
Id. at 3–4. Additionally, sexual harassment “occurs when a teacher . . . creates a
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Code in Hill.
Also, the remainder of the speech banned by these
regulations does not relate to the state’s interest of curtailing child
sexual abuse, just as the remainder of the speech banned by the Hill
ordinance did not relate to the state’s interest of curtailing disorderly
230
conduct and unprotected, obscene language.
Therefore, bans
prohibiting teacher-student communication via electronic media
have the effect of only prohibiting appropriate and permissible
speech because the speech and conduct sought to be eliminated is
already deemed criminal by statute.
The expansive nature of social-media bans is blatantly overinclusive
in the content restricted. In sum, the bans are overbroad because
they prohibit (1) protected expressions, (2) communications by
teachers with a large group of individuals that utilizes these types of
sites, and (3) vast amounts of expression that do not contribute to the
evil sought to be remedied. Nevertheless, succeeding on an
231
overbreadth challenge has proven to be difficult and rare.
B. Bans on Teacher-Student Electronic Communication Will Also Fail a
Facial Challenge Under Intermediate Scrutiny
Even if an overbreadth challenge to laws banning teacher-student
communication via electronic media fails, a facial challenge to these
laws under the applicable standard of judicial scrutiny is still available
and achievable. State and school district bans are not likely to pass
constitutional muster when facially challenged under a traditional
First Amendment intermediate scrutiny standard. The bans are not
narrowly tailored because they do not effectively further the state’s
legitimate interest and burden a large amount of permissible speech,
232
while also prohibiting all modes of communication via the Internet.
First, intermediate scrutiny is the applicable standard because the
233
bans are content-neutral regulations of speech.
Regulations
hostile environment that is sufficiently serious to deny or limit a student’s ability to
participate in or benefit from the school’s program.” Id. at 6.
229. Hill, 482 U.S. at 460–63.
230. See id. at 462 (describing the ordinance as sweeping and “not limited to
fighting words nor even to obscene or opprobrious language”).
231. See supra note 51 and accompanying text (admitting the difficulty of
succeeding on an overbreadth challenge of a regulation of speech).
232. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 798 (1989) (explaining that a
narrowly tailored regulation must “serve the government’s legitimate, contentneutral interests but that it need not be the least restrictive or least intrusive means
of doing so”).
233. See supra notes 98–103 and accompanying text (describing content-neutral
regulations as those that do not regulate subject matter and providing the Supreme
Court’s jurisprudence that applies intermediate scrutiny to such regulations). But see

DI MARZO.OFF_TO_PRINTER_REVISED (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

WHY CAN’T WE BE FRIENDS?

10/23/2012 12:56 PM

159

banning teacher-student communication via social media prohibit
entire modes of communication regardless of the content of the
234
The bans seek to regulate a manner of speech,
speech involved.
rather than a specific subject matter or message conveyed by the
235
speech. Thus, by qualifying as content neutral, the bans are subject
236
to intermediate scrutiny when courts review them.
In Rock Against Racism, the Supreme Court delineated the test for
237
intermediate scrutiny. Bans on teacher-student communication via
electronic media will fail under intermediate scrutiny because they do
238
not satisfy the second and third prongs under Rock Against Racism.
The bans are not narrowly tailored to serve the state’s interest in
protecting children from sexual abuse because they do not prevent
sexual abuse from occurring and are substantially broader than
239
necessary to achieve the interest. The bans also eliminate all modes
of electronic communication, which precludes essentially all

Michelen, supra note 38 (applying strict scrutiny to analyze social-media bans by
reasoning that laws that limit speech are usually subject to strict scrutiny); Jay Rivera,
New Student-Teacher Facebook Ban Raises Constitutional Concerns, LEGALMATCH L. BLOG
(Aug. 12, 2011), http://lawblog.legalmatch.com/2011/08/12/student-teacherfacebook-ban-raises-constitutional-concerns-2 (examining social-media bans under a
strict scrutiny standard by reasoning that the freedom of speech is a fundamental
right and laws regulating fundamental rights must pass strict scrutiny).
234. Mo. State Teachers Ass’n v. State, No. 11AC-CC00553, 2011 WL 4425537
(Mo. Cir. Ct. Sept. 23, 2011); see also Michelen, supra note 38 (quoting Senator
Cunningham stating that she supports the Missouri law because exclusive
communication leads to sexual misconduct).
235. See Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. at 791 (guidelines mandating the use of cityprovided sound equipment and technicians were content neutral); Members of the
City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 804 (1984) (ban on the posting
of signs on public property was content neutral).
236. See Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. at 791 (explaining that the government may
impose “reasonable restrictions” as long as the restrictions are content neutral,
narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and leave open enough
alternative channels for the communication of the information); United States v.
O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) (“[G]overnment regulation is sufficiently justified
. . . if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the
governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the
incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is
essential to the furtherance of that interest.”).
237. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. at 791 (quoting Clark v. Cmty. for Creative NonViolence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)). To meet intermediate scrutiny, the regulation
must: (1) further a significant government interest; (2) be narrowly tailored to serve
that interest; and (3) leave open ample alternative modes of communication. Id. at
792 (quoting Clark, 468 U.S. at 293).
238. Id.
239. Id.; see infra notes 245–58 and accompanying text (explaining that a complete
ban of teacher-student electronic communication is an inefficient means of
preventing child sexual abuse by teachers and that such a ban fails to pass
intermediate scrutiny).
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communication between teachers and students outside the
240
classroom, leaving few, if any, alternative modes of communication.
States and school districts undeniably have a compelling interest in
protecting children from sexual abuse and other physical and
241
emotional harms.
Child sexual abuse by teachers has existed for
242
centuries, and although it is possible that social media could
facilitate teachers in communicating with their students to establish
inappropriate relationships, social media did not create the problem
243
and has not necessarily increased the number of incidents.
Even
generally speaking, personally directed communications via
electronic media between a child and another person that are of
244
serious concern to the child and parents are rare.
The bans do not effectively further the state’s interest of protecting
children from sexual abuse by their teachers and thus are not
245
narrowly tailored.
For the bans to survive intermediate scrutiny,
246
they must further a significant government interest, and the means
240. See Mo. State Teachers Ass’n v. State, No. 11AC-CC00553, 2011 WL 4425537
(Mo. Cir. Ct. Sept. 23, 2011) (finding that often, if not always, social media is the sole
method of teacher-student communication); see also Garrison, supra note 217 (stating
that the Missouri ban completely eliminates a teacher’s ability to communicate with
students and parents).
241. See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 607 (1982)
(“[S]afeguarding the physical and psychological well-being of a minor [is]
compelling . . . .”); see also Arcamona, supra note 216 (insisting that state legislators
and public school officials have a high interest in protecting students from sexual
assault, especially by state employees such as teachers).
242. See supra note 10 and accompanying text (demonstrating that child sexual
abuse by teachers was prevalent long before social media existed).
243. Vickery, supra note 203 (asserting that social media is not the problem and
that instead, criminal behavior is what causes child predation, and if a teacher has illintentions, a law banning him or her from communicating with a student via social
media will not prevent inappropriate communication with that student through
other means or by violating the ban). But see Ramasastry, supra note 38 (citing to the
testimony of a police officer during the hearings on the Missouri law that revealed
that there had been at least four cases in which teachers used text messaging and
social media to have inappropriate sexual contact with students).
244. The National School Boards Association conducted a study regarding direct
communications with children via social media and found:
About one in 14 students (7 percent) say someone has asked them for
information about their personal identity on a social networking site; 6
percent of parents concur. About one in 14 students (7 percent) say they’ve
experienced self-defined cyberbullying; 5 percent of parents concur. About
one in 25 students (4 percent) say they’ve had conversations on social
networking sites that made them uncomfortable; 3 percent of parents
concur.
NAT’L SCH. BDS. ASS’N, supra note 211, at 6.
245. Cf. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 529 (2001) (finding that the
state demonstrated a substantial interest in preventing access to tobacco products by
children and adopted an adequately narrow ban advancing that interest).
246. Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
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used to accomplish that interest must serve the end goal being
247
Here, the complete banning of teacher-student
sought.
communication via electronic media does not efficiently further the
248
end being sought: the prevention of child sexual abuse by teachers.
Moreover, the state’s interest in protecting children from sexual
abuse is not furthered by the bans any more than the interest would
249
be furthered in the absence of these bans.
Teachers seeking
inappropriate contact with students are still able to initiate such
contact by speaking to students in person at school, calling students
250
via the phone, or writing notes to students on paper. Furthermore,
there has been no demonstration that social media or other websites
are more prone to abuse than any other form of communication, but
nevertheless, the laws treat these different forms of communication
251
in radically different ways.
Paralleling the overbreadth argument, these laws also do not satisfy
the narrow tailoring prong under Rock Against Racism because they
are substantially broader than necessary to achieve the government’s
252
interest. For a regulation to be narrowly tailored it must “target[]
247. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799 (1989).
248. Teachers have other means of contacting students and thus those with
inappropriate intentions can find other ways to initiate communication. Ramasastry,
supra note 38.
249. See Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. at 799 (“The requirement of narrow
tailoring is satisfied ‘so long as the . . . regulation promotes a substantial government
interest that would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation.’” (quoting
United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689 (1985))); see also Casey Chan, Missouri
Has Banned Teachers from Being Facebook Friends with Students, GIZMODO (Aug. 1, 2011,
11:15 AM), http://gizmodo.com/5826539/missouri-has-banned-teachers-from-being
-facebook-friends-with-students (asserting that prohibiting teachers and students
from communicating through Facebook could never stop teachers from
inappropriately interacting with students when teachers still see their students in real
life everyday); Michelen, supra note 38 (explaining that it is naïve to believe that a
teacher will not violate these bans if the teacher is willing to engage in sexual
misconduct in violation of criminal statutes); Vickery, supra note 203 (arguing that a
ban on teacher-student communication via social media will not prevent teachers
from inappropriately communicating with their students if the teachers so desire
because teachers can communicate through different means, such as hand-written
notes, and can also communicate in violation of the ban).
250. See Ramasastry, supra note 38 (rationalizing that even though there have been
cases in which teachers have used social media and text messaging to inappropriately
contact students, banning these modes of communication will not prevent such
misconduct because teachers who desire to have sexual communications with
students can still do so by speaking to students at school, via phone, or by schoolapproved e-mail).
251. See Muray, supra note 1 (discussing the radically different ways in which the
bill handles private communication between teachers and students depending on
the medium).
252. See supra Part II.A (analyzing the bans under the overbreadth doctrine and
determining that the bans prohibit a substantial amount of protected and beneficial
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and eliminate[] no more than the exact source of the ‘evil’ it seeks to
253
Unlike in Rock Against Racism, where the exact source of
remedy.”
254
evil, the volume of performances, was the only target of the statute,
a ban on all teacher-student communication via electronic media
does not only target the few inappropriate interactions, but instead
255
eliminates all possible expression through the banned media.
Furthermore, applying the reasoning detailed in Free Speech
256
Coalition, the child-protection rationale at the foundation of these
bans does not apply to a majority of the expression banned by the
257
regulations.
In other words, the expression the bans target is
mostly speech that does not contribute or even relate to child sexual
abuse and that has no reason to be curtailed because it is either
258
educational or beneficial to students.
Finally, regulations banning all communication via social media
and electronic media fail the third prong of intermediate scrutiny
because they do not allow for ample alternative modes of
communication.
Unlike the regulation on the volume of
performances in Rock Against Racism, which the Court found did not
foreclose ample alternatives of communication because the guideline
259
did not close down the forum, here the bans close down all
260
Even
electronic fora that allow for exclusive communication.
though there may be alternative approved methods of
communication provided by the school, such as e-mail, the bans
preclude the vast majority of modes of communication between
speech, and thus the bans are not effectively furthering the state’s interest in
protecting children from sexual abuse).
253. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 485 (1988).
254. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. at 802.
255. See Lieb, supra note 39 (expressing the concern that bans prohibit the use of
media regardless of whether the media is used in the classroom or outside the
classroom).
256. See supra notes 82–89 and accompanying text (summarizing the reasoning
expounded in Free Speech Coalition).
257. The purpose of the bans is to protect children from inappropriate contact
with their teachers; however, the bans prohibit a vast amount of appropriate and
beneficial speech. See supra notes 183–218 (arguing the positive value of socialmedia use by teachers, including the opportunity to comment on public interest
issues and common issues relevant to students).
258. See supra notes 206–14 and accompanying text (providing examples of the
positive and beneficial uses of social media by teachers, such as providing a safe and
comfortable space for students to discuss sensitive issues, providing extra assistance
outside the classroom, getting reluctant students more involved in the material, and
preparing students for the role social media will play in their adult lives).
259. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. at 802.
260. See Muray, supra note 1 (discussing how the Missouri ban could be extended
to educational services like Blackboard, which has a private messaging feature built
in).

DI MARZO.OFF_TO_PRINTER_REVISED (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

WHY CAN’T WE BE FRIENDS?

10/23/2012 12:56 PM

163

teachers and students, especially when the banned modes are the
most prevalent, if not the sole, methods of communication teachers
261
Although bans on teacher-student communication
employ today.
via electronic media are likely to fail under either an overbreadth
challenge or intermediate scrutiny, there are guidelines a state or
school board can implement that would achieve the state’s interest in
protecting children from sexual abuse without running afoul of the
First Amendment.
III. CONSTITUTIONALLY PERMISSIBLE GUIDELINES REGULATING
INAPPROPRIATE TEACHER-STUDENT COMMUNICATION VIA ELECTRONIC
MEDIA
There are several guidelines a state or school district can
implement in order to deter inappropriate interactions between
teachers and students via social media without infringing upon
262
teachers’ First Amendment rights.
Constitutionally permissible
guidelines for teacher-student communication via electronic media
cannot proscribe complete modes of communication and must be
drawn to address the compelling governmental interest of protecting
263
students from sexual abuse more precisely.
Although the First
Amendment gives school districts tremendous leeway in disciplining
educators for their speech both within and outside of school,
264
educators still retain some protection under the First Amendment.
261. See, e.g., Mo. State Teachers Ass’n v. State, No. 11AC-CC00553, 2011 WL
4425537 (Mo. Cir. Ct. Sept. 23, 2011) (enjoining the enforcement of a ban on
teachers using Internet sites that “allow exclusive access with a current or former
student” because the ban had a “chilling effect” on speech).
262. See, e.g., Hamilton County Schools Technology Acceptable Usage Agreement,
HAMILTON CNTY. DEP’T OF EDUC., available at http://www.hcde.org/media/HCDE_
AUP_Employee_Student.pdf (recommending specific social-networking websites
and requiring parental consent for teachers contacting students via text messages);
St. Thomas Episcopal School Social Media Policy, ST. THOMAS EPISCOPAL SCH., available at
http://www.stthomaskids.com/socialmedia.pdf (recognizing the importance of
social media in “engaging, collaborating, learning, and sharing in the fast-moving
world of the Internet” and setting forth guidelines to ensure that such social media is
used responsibly). See Meredith Hines-Dochterman, Cedar Rapids School Board
Reviews Social Media Policy, GAZETTE (Sept. 12, 2011, 8:05 PM), http://thegazette.com
/2011/09/12/cedar-rapids-school-board-reviews-social-media-policy, for an example
of a proposed social-media regulation that also acknowledges teachers’ First
Amendment rights and balances those rights against the school district’s right to
regulate the speech of employees in certain circumstances.
263. See supra Part II.A–B (examining why the bans would violate the First
Amendment and concluding that the main problem is that the bans are not narrowly
tailored because they do not effectively further the state’s interest while also
overreaching to volumes of protected and appropriate speech).
264. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145–47 (1983) (declaring that the only
public employee expression that is protected by the First Amendment is speech that
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Thus, states and school districts cannot impose strict bans that would
infringe on the remaining free speech rights that teachers possess.
Instead, schools should inform teachers about what conduct via
social media is appropriate and what conduct might be construed as
265
inappropriate and not tolerated.
Additionally, guidelines should
provide suggestions that will assist teachers in ensuring that they are
266
utilizing social media in an acceptable manner.
For example,
teachers should be told to refrain from sharing information with
students that would not be appropriate to share in the school
267
environment.
In general, teachers should refrain from sharing
their private cell phone numbers, pictures, and e-mail addresses with
268
Teachers must maintain a professional tone during all
students.
269
communications with students. It is wise for teachers to also involve
their students’ parents by giving them access to the social-media
270
Moreover,
websites used for classroom and educational activities.
teachers should be cognizant that the majority of the information
271
they post via social media can be accessed by anyone.
Consequently, they need to monitor their accounts and manage their
privacy settings to ensure no inappropriate content exists or is
272
visible.
The content on their sites should not include criticism of
regards a matter of public concern—all other employee speech is unprotected and
thus can be prohibited and punished by the government).
265. See Hines-Dochterman, supra note 262 (noting that public employees need
guidance in this developing area of law).
266. See Daniel Solove, Should Teachers Be Banned from Communicating with Students
Online?, CONCURRING OPINIONS (Dec. 17, 2011), http://www.concurring
opinions.com/archives/2011/12/should-teachers-be-banned-from-communicatingwith-students-online.html (enumerating several considerations that school districts
should acknowledge when formulating their social-media policies).
267. See Social Media in the Classroom: The Digital Safety Debate (Pt. 3), SAFE KEEPING
BLOG (Mar. 20, 2012), http://www.ikeepsafe.org/educational-issues/social-media-inthe-classroom-the-digital-safety-debate-part-3-of-3 (finding that teachers “over-share”
information via social media and suggesting that teachers only engage in academicrelated conversations with students in order to avoid disciplinary actions).
268. See ONT. COLL. OF TEACHERS, PROFESSIONAL ADVISORY: USE OF ELECTRONIC
COMMUNICATION AND SOCIAL MEDIA 6 (2011), available at http://www.oct.ca/
publications/PDF/Prof_Adv_Soc_Media_EN.pdf (discussing how to minimize risks
associated with online communication by interacting with students appropriately).
269. Id. at 6; see Hines-Dochterman, supra note 262 (stating that employees are
expected to maintain appropriate professional boundaries when communicating
with students via social media).
270. ONT. COLL. OF TEACHERS, supra note 268, at 6; cf. Social Media in the Classroom,
supra note 267 (urging teachers to get parental consent before using social media to
communicate with students). Students would still be able to privately contact
teachers about personal problems through other media, such as e-mail.
271. ONT. COLL. OF TEACHERS, supra note 268, at 4; see Hines-Dochterman, supra
note 262 (suggesting that teachers should set privacy settings at the highest level).
272. See ONT. COLL. OF TEACHERS, supra note 268, at 6 (discussing how to minimize
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students or employers or other impulsive, heated, or inappropriate
273
comments.
Further, in order to address the compelling governmental interest
more precisely, school districts should set forth clear examples of
274
inappropriate conduct and communication.
Teachers should be
specifically informed that such actions as sending graphic, sexual
material to students, fraternizing with students and non-students, and
engaging in behavior or making remarks of a sexual nature are
inappropriate and can subject them to employment termination and
275
criminal prosecution. By doing so, states and school districts will be
targeting the exact problem they are attempting to eliminate, without
276
As more and
prohibiting any appropriate or protected speech.
more children are communicating and getting their news and
information via social media, regulations banning teacher-student
electronic communication not only infringe upon teachers’ First
277
Amendment rights but also upon students’ education.
Guidelines
informing teachers how to use social media effectively and how to
conduct themselves appropriately will allow teachers to utilize
electronic media in a manner that benefits students while curtailing
inappropriate communication and not violating the Constitution.
CONCLUSION
The controversy over the use of electronic media by teachers
generally and in education is still unresolved and hotly debated
throughout the nation. It is undeniable that social media may expose

the risk of inappropriate teacher-student communication via electronic media);
Nancy Solomon, Friendly Advice for Teachers: Beware of Facebook, NPR (Dec. 7, 2011),
http://www.npr.org/2011/12/07/143264921/friendly-advice-for-teachers-beware-offacebook (citing to Florida’s Lake County Schools social-media guidelines).
273. ONT. COLL. OF TEACHERS, supra note 268, at 6; see Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S.
138, 146–47 (1983) (holding that criticism of the school was not a matter of public
concern, and thus the employee could be terminated because her speech was not
protected under the First Amendment); Solomon, supra note 272 (describing
instances when teachers spoke negatively online about students and were suspended
or fired as a result).
274. See Michelen, supra note 38 (explaining that there are other ways to limit the
exposure to inappropriate communication between students and teachers, such as
educating both about appropriate behavior in school and online).
275. ANDY MANN, CALHOUN INTERMEDIATE SCH. DISTRICT, BEST PRACTICES FOR
GUIDING STAFF IN USE OF SOCIAL MEDIA 4 (2010), available at http://socialmedia
guidelines.pbworks.com/f/Social+Media+Best+Practices+IV+-+Andy+Mann.pdf.
276. See Ramasastry, supra note 38 (describing the purpose of the ban: to protect
school-aged children from sexual predators at school).
277. See supra notes 206–14 and accompanying text (illustrating the benefits of
social media that would be curtailed if the ban were to be implemented).
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students to inappropriate material and facilitate teacher predators in
contacting students; however, social media is not the enemy and the
278
educational benefits it provides far outweigh the risks. Indeed, Amy
Hestir’s testimony demonstrated that child sexual abuse by teachers
279
occurs even without the use of social media. Thus, targeting social
media will not completely resolve the issue and arguably will not
ameliorate it either. As states and school districts continue to revisit
and implement electronic and social-media policies, they must be
careful not to draft regulations that would abridge teachers’ freedom
of speech and thus run afoul of the First Amendment.
Presently, there are robust arguments for a challenge of certain
state and school district bans on teacher-student communication via
electronic media as facially violative of the First Amendment of the
Constitution under the overbreadth doctrine and under intermediate
scrutiny. The bans are overbroad due to their exceedingly sweeping
scope and ineffective response to the state’s interest of protecting
children from sexual abuse by their teachers. Under intermediate
scrutiny, these bans are unconstitutional because they do not
effectively further the legitimate state’s interest in protecting children
from sexual abuse and are not sufficiently narrowly tailored to that
end. Nevertheless, alternative effective guidelines are available —
guidelines that do not run afoul of the First Amendment while
furthering the interest of protecting students from sexual abuse and
allowing for the rich educational benefits that such media provide.
In an electronic universe, where young people rely on electronic
media to acquire information, become educated about certain topics,
and contribute their ideas, banning teachers from tapping into such
a powerful tool will only handicap the education and innovation of
our youth.

278. See Social Networking in Schools, supra note 192 (citing several studies on the use
of social media by students and summarizing the benefits reported and the
misconceptions about the risks involved with its use).
279. See Muray, supra note 1 (discussing the Amy Hestir Student Protection Act,
which was named for a student-victim of an abusive sexual relationship with a teacher
that did not originate online).

